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HOSPITAL MARKET STRUCTURE, HOSPITAL
COMPETITION, AND CONSUMER
WELFARE: WHAT CAN THE
EVIDENCE TELL US?
Paul A. Pautler and Michael G. Vita*
I. INTRODUCIION
A fundamental premise of federal health care antitrust enforcement
efforts is that vigorous market competition will result in a socially desira-
ble allocation of resources to (and within) the health care sector. This
premise has become increasingly controversial. The application of the
competitive market paradigm to the analysis and design of health care
policies has been criticized by both health care economists and health
care professionals. Economists and health planners argue that market
failures arising from imperfect information and third-party reimburse-
ment will defeat the ability of unregulated markets to allocate health care
resources efficiently.' Health care professionals, on the other hand, ar-
gue that sellers of health care services are not (or, at any rate, should not
be) governed by the types of profit-seeking behavior that motivate pro-
ducers of other goods and services; policies that encourage competition
among physicians and hospitals, it is further argued, only exacerbate2 a
trend toward excessive commercialization of health care.3
In one important sense, both criticisms share a common origin:
namely, the presumed ignorance of the ultimate consumers of medical
* Bureau of Economics, Federal frade Commission. This article reflects the opin-
ions of the authors and is not intended to represent the position of the Federal Trade
Commission or the views of any individual Commissioner.
1. See generally James C. Robinson, Hospital Quality Competition and the Economics
of Imperfect Competition, 66 MILBANK 0. 465 (1988).
2. For an enlightening exchange of views on ethical issues associated with for-profit
health care, see Arnold S. Relman, M.D., & Uwe Reinhardt, An Exchange on For-Profit
Health Care, in FoR-PRoFIT ENTERPRISE IN HEALTH CARE 209 (Bradford H. Gray, Ph.D.,
ed., 1986).
3. See Arnold S. Relman, M.D., What Market Values Are Doing to Medicine, ATLAN.
Tic, March 1992, at 98.
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care, and the resultant existence of what economists call a "principal-
agent" relationship between the buyer (i.e., the patient) and a seller (e.g.,
a physician) who also makes purchasing decisions on the patient's be-
half.' Absent consumer ignorance, much of the basis for the efficiency
critique,5 and virtually all of the basis for the ethical critique, would evap-
orate, as there would no longer be any information imperfections for
profit-seeking agents to exploit.
While no serious student of health care economics denies that real-
world medical markets differ from the perfectly competitive markets of
the introductory economics texts, this observation by itself is empty; vir-
tually no real-world market satisfies the conditions necessary for "per-
fect" competition. In our view, the debate over health care reform has
focused excessively on cataloguing the ways in which health care markets
fail to satisfy the conditions of perfect competition, to the neglect of
other, more important issues. The meaningful questions are: (1) how im-
portant are these departures from the abstract world of perfect competi-
tion?; (2) what types of market institutions can develop (or have
developed) to address problems created by these departures?; and (3)
how does the performance of a necessarily imperfect market compare
with the performance of necessarily imperfect alternative methods for al-
locating health care resources?
Providing definitive answers to all of these questions is beyond the
scope of this paper. We have a more modest goal: to review two strands
of the immense empirical literature on the positive and normative aspects
of hospital and health care competition. The first examines the relation-
ship between hospital competition and hospital costs, prices, and service
quality. We review two decades of research on structure-performance re-
lationships in hospital markets and attempt to determine what is known
about the costs and benefits of hospital competition. We conclude that,
due to flaws in research design and methodology, existing empirical work
has not yielded much useful information on the welfare implications of
differences in hospital market structure. Most studies (especially those
completed before the late 1980s) focused principally on the relationship
of market structure to "costs," rather than to prices or price-cost margins;
moreover, the literature largely ignored the impact of market structure
on quality variation.
4. See generally Kenneth J. Arrow, Agency in the Market, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MATH-
EMATICAL ECONOMICS 1183 (Kenneth J. Arrow & Michael D. Intriligator eds., 1986).
5. Questions relating to the efficiency consequences of third-party reimbursement
would remain.
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Not surprisingly, the failure of the empirical literature to explore prop-
erly issues of pricing and quality severely impairs its ability to illuminate
any of the normative issues that now dominate the public debate on
health care. One particularly surprising and pervasive element in this
literature is the assumed (often implicitly) invidious nature of nonprice
competition among health care providers. This presumption seldom is
defended, other than through oblique references to the above-mentioned
principal-agent problems. Neither theory nor existing evidence can jus-
tify the antipathy toward competition that characterizes much of the
scholarly research on hospital competition. Researchers who condemn
nonprice competition have tended to assume, rather than demonstrate,
that increases in the intensity of this competition harms society.
We also examine the still-developing literature on the effects of health
maintenance organizations (HMOs), preferred provider organizations
(PPOs), and other competition "experiments" on hospital and health care
costs. This literature has, of necessity, focused on those areas where these
market institutions have developed most fully (e.g., Minnesota and Cali-
fornia). Although the evidence from the California experience is still un-
folding, it supports the proposition that markets can work, provided
market participants are given the flexibility to engage in arrangements
that address the principal-agent problems that arise in these settings.
While the literature on hospital competition, market institutions, and
health care market outcomes is incomplete in several important respects,
we observe that this is beginning to improve. Recently, researchers have
begun to adopt research strategies that will better address the questions
that we consider the most relevant for the design of public policy. Ac-
cordingly, answers to these questions have at last started to take shape.
As more reliable measures of hospital quality are developed, and as more
instances of true competition develop, analysts will be much better posi-
tioned to draw clearer pictures of structure-performance relationships in
hospital markets. This will enable policy makers to make much more in-
formed judgments about the benefits and costs of hospital competition.6
II. INCENTIVE STRUCTURES AND HOSPITAL COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR
Most empirical analyses of hospital competition have been premised on
the notion that explicit price competition rarely occurs in this industry.
6. Nevertheless, further competition experiments may not in fact be tried, as certifi-
cate-of-need regulation is coming back into vogue. See Robert Pear, States Are Moving to
Re-Regulation on Health Costs, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1992, at Al, A10.
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Indeed, hospital markets often possess features that may diminish the in-
centives of hospitals to engage in the type of price competition that is
commonly observed in most other markets. These features include exten-
sive insurance coverage and high consumer search costs. Consequently, a
large number of studies have examined the impact of market structure on
hospital expenses or costs (which are often thought to serve as proxies for
"quality"), although some of the more recent empirical work has at-
tempted to analyze hospital pricing behavior. Before turning to a discus-
sion of these studies, however, we discuss the reasons why these features
of health care markets may attenuate the incentives for price
competition.
As noted in the introduction to this paper, the criticism of the perform-
ance of health care market behavior has, at its heart, the existence of
what economists term "principal-agent" problems. Kenneth Arrow suc-
cinctly characterizes principal-agent problems as follows:
The common element is the presence of two individuals. One
(the agent) is to choose an action among a number of alternative
possibilities. The action affects the welfare of the other, the
principal, as well as that of the agent's self. . . .The problem
acquires interest only when there is uncertainty at some point,
and in particular, when the information available to the two par-
ticipants in unequal. The main but not only case in the literature
is that where the agent's action is not directly observable by the
principal and where in addition the outcome is affected but not
completely determined by the agent's action. (If the latter were
not true, the principal could in effect infer the agent's action by
observing the outcome.)
7
There are two main principal-agent relationships that might conceiva-
bly contribute to imperfections in health care markets. The first is the
physician-patient relationship; the second, the patient-insurer relation-
ship. In the former, the physician, acting as agent for his patient, provides
both diagnosis and treatment. The patient is presumed to have less infor-
mation than the doctor, and thus cannot ascertain whether the medical
benefits of the recommended treatment outweigh the costs. This igno-
rance provides the physician with a financial incentive to recommend
treatments that would not be purchased by a fully informed consumer.
This incentive to overprescribe services is commonly referred to as "de-
mand inducement.",
8
7. See Arrow, supra note 4, at 1183.
8. See David Dranove, Demand Inducement and the Physician/Patient Relationship,
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A second principal-agent problem is created by the presence of health
insurance. Here, patients can be thought of as "agents" for their insurers,
making consumption decisions that will affect the insurers' profits.9 The
potential inefficiency arises because health insurance typically reduces
substantially the out-of-pocket (marginal) cost to consumers of health
services. Accordingly, the price paid by consumers may not vary with the
amount of services purchased or the source of those services. Under such
conditions, consumers have little incentive to search for lower-priced
providers, because most of the gains from search accrue to others (i.e.,
the insurer), and not to the insured.10 The absence of an incentive to
search, in turn, diminishes providers' incentives to cut prices, because
output (and profits) will be unresponsive to these cuts."
26 ECON. INQUIRY 281 (1988); see generally Michael R. Darby & Edi Karni, Free Competi-
tion and the Optimal Amount of Fraud, 16 J.L. & ECON. 67 (1973); Roger Feldman &
Frank Sloan, Competition Among Physicians, Revisited, 13 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.
239 (1988) (concluding that there is some evidence of physician inducement in the market
for surgical services, but little evidence of inducement in the market for primary physician
services).
9. A significant percentage of all U.S. citizens is covered by some kind of health
insurance. For instance, of the $531 billion spent on personal health care in 1989, only $125
billion (24%) was paid directly by patients. The other 76% was covered by government
(40%), private insurance (33%), or industrial in-plant provision or philanthropy (3%).
Third-party payments constitute an even larger portion of hospital expenditures. In 1989,
94% of the nation's $233 billion hospital bill was paid by third parties. As of 1991, esti-
mates indicate that 36 million Americans (15% of the population) were not covered by
health insurance. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 94 (1991); EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE,
SOURCES OF HEALTH INSURANCE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED: ANALYSIS
OF THE MARCH 1991 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY (1992).
10. A consumer would gain from the use of low cost providers if the cost of such
search and any reduction in service quality was offset by subsequent reductions in his in-
surance premiums. Savings to the insurer, however, are not typically passed on directly to
the consumer who chooses the low cost provider. The gains from consumer search might
also be captured by the consumer's employer if the consumer is enrolled in an employer-
based insurance plan, as is common. In either case, the individual normally has little incen-
tive to search for low cost providers. If subject to actual or potential competition, insurers
have incentives to encourage their policy holders to patronize low cost suppliers. See infra
part VI (discussing innovations in third-party reimbursement (e.g., "health maintenance
organizations" and "preferred provider organizations") that provide a different incentive
structure and that are intended to pass back savings to the insured). Such systems, if prop-
erly Structured within the employer-based insurance system, tend to encourage price
competition.
11. Indeed, the presence of insurance likely exacerbates providers' incentives to over-
prescribe services, because part of the cost of the services will be borne by a third party.
There is a sizable literature indicating that the level of insurance coverage matters and
affects both the consumer's and the health care provider's incentives. E.g., Willard G.
Manning et al., Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from a Ran-
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Other features of health care markets contribute to high consumer
search costs, and thus to the existence of possible market imperfections.
Price information, for example, has not been readily available for many
of the services offered by hospitals. Without access to this information,
consumers will find it difficult to identify and patronize low price suppli-
ers." This problem is aggravated further by the large number of individ-
ual services (e.g., room and board, lab services, nursing services,
operating room, etc.) that are consumed during the stay and that are
priced individually. The consumer must compare baskets of aggregated
prices across hospitals if he wishes to find the lowest cost provider.
Although it is clear that health care markets are characterized by infor-
mational asymmetries and imperfections, the practical (and policy) signif-
icance of this observation is unclear. Many economists apparently
believe that information asymmetries can be found in a wide variety of
market settings. Indeed, one prominent writer has claimed that "infor-
mational imperfections have fundamental implications for how product
markets function, at least for many (most) of the commodities which con-
sumers purchase."' 3 If this belief is correct, health care markets would
have no claim to uniqueness on these grounds. Although one might rea-
sonably argue that the degree of asymmetry is more severe in hospital
markets than elsewhere, the theoretical literature shows that even minor
departures from a world of perfect information can, in principle, cause
domized Experiment, 77 Am. ECON. REV. 251, 258 (1987) (finding in the RAND experi-
ments that a free health care plan realized expenses that were 46% higher than those
realized by a plan with 95% co-payment requirement for the first $450). Other studies
have shown that uninsured individuals are admitted less often to the hospital and/or re-
ceive less health care during hospital stays than do insured individuals. See, e.g., John Z.
Ayanian et al., The Relation Between Health Insurance Coverage and Clinical Outcomes
Among Women with Breast Cancer, 239 NEw ENG. J. MED. 326, 328-30 (1993); Paula A.
Braveman et al., Differences in Hospital Resource Allocation Among Sick Newborns Ac-
cording to Insurance Coverage, 266 JAMA 3300, 3303, 3306-07 (1991); Jack Hadley et al.,
Comparison of Uninsured and Privately Insured Hospital Patients, 265 JAMA 374, 378-79
(1991); Randall S. Stafford, The Impact of Nonclinical Factors on Repeat Cesarean Section,
265 JAMA 59, 61-62 (1991); Joel Weissman & Arnold M. Epstein, Case Mix and Resource
Utilization by Uninsured Hospital Patients in the Boston Metropolitan Area, 261 JAMA
3572, 3575 (1989). Hadley's and Ayanian's evidence also implies that uninsured individuals
achieve worse outcomes for a given severity of illness.
12. See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961),
reprinted in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 171-90 (1968); George J. Stigler, Price and
Non-Price Competition, 76 J. POL. ECON. 149 (1968), reprinted in THE ORGANIZATION OF
INDUSTRY 23-28 (1968) (discussing the importance of information in generating price
competition).
13. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Imperfect Information in the Product Market, in 1 HANDBOOK
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 769, 843 (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig eds., 1989).
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large departures from the full-information competitive equilibrium values
for price, quantity, and quality. Nonetheless, society has allowed eco-
nomic activity in these nonhealth-related markets to be governed by the
competitive, self-interested behavior of buyers and sellers. The appar-
ently ubiquitous nature of information imperfections would seem to sug-
gest, however, either that this policy is gravely misconceived or that
performance in these markets, though inferior to that obtainable in the
nonexistent world of perfect information, is nevertheless superior to that
which could be achieved through alternative institutional arrangements.
Ultimately, one cannot resolve these issues on the basis of theoretical
analysis. Empirical evidence is required. It is to this that we now turn.
In this review, we look specifically at studies of hospital market behavior
to assess what information they might offer to resolve the positive and
normative issues of hospital competition.
III. EMPIRICAL LINKS BETWEEN MARKET STRUCTURE, EXPENSES,
AND LENGTH-OF-STAY
A. Early Studies
Many studies of hospital competition have examined the links between
market structure' 4 and hospital expenses or costs. Joskow presented per-
haps the first attempt to estimate a model in which the relationships be-
tween market structure and nonprice competition were explicitly
measured.'" He assumed that hospital administrators seek to maximize
some "utility function" defined over the quantity, quality, and scope of
services provided. Due to extensive third party reimbursement, Joskow
argued that hospitals face few incentives to price compete. Further, he
argued that patients make hospital choices indirectly, through their
14. It should be emphasized that the key market structure variable used in most of
these studies, the Herfindahl index, is only a proxy for competition. For a discussion of the
problems associated with using concentration as a proxy for competition, see Harold Dem-
setz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THE NEW
LEARNING (H. Goldschmidt et al. eds., 1974).
15. Paul L. Joskow, The Effects of Competition and Regulation on Hospital Bed Supply
and the Reservation Quality of the Hospital, 11 BELL J. ECON. 421 (1980). Although studies
of hospital costs predated Joskow's, none found statistically significant relationships be-
tween market structure and costs. See, e.g., Karen Davis, The Role of Technology, Demand
and Labor Markets in the Determination of Hospital Costs, in THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH
AND MEDICAL CARE 283 (M. Perlman ed., 1974); Karen Davis, An Empirical Analysis of
Alternative Models of the Hospital Industry, Address at the American Economic Associa-
tion (Dec. 20, 1972); C. Watts, A Managerial Discretion Model for Hospitals (1976) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University).
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choice of physician. Hospitals therefore compete for patients by at-
tracting additional staff physicians through the provision of higher quality
services. "Higher quality" in Joskow's model is measured by the hospi-
tal's "average reserve margin," defined as the excess of available beds
over the average daily census (in percent). Physicians value increases in
the average reserve margin because it reduces expected admission delays,
and because physicians believe that hospitals provide better care when
they are operating well below their capacity constraints.16
Joskow's empirical model sought to explain variations in "reserve mar-
gins" through indices of market concentration (measured at the standard
metropolitan statistical area/SMSA level), entry conditions (a variable in-
dicating the presence of certificate-of-need/CON laws), and the ratio of
physicians to hospitals (to reflect hospital competition for physician affili-
ations).' 7 Overall, the empirical results conformed closely to Joskow's
prior expectations. Reductions in the number of hospitals, as measured
by high values for the Herfindahl index, significantly reduced the size of
hospitals' average reserve margins.' 8 Increases in the number of physi-
cians in the market, and the presence of CON regulations, also signifi-
cantly reduced reserve margins. Joskow interpreted these results as
evidence that increased competition can have undesirable efficiency ef-
fects, in that it may lead to "uneconomic expansions in the quantity and
quality of care provided."' 9
Wilson and Jadlow used 1973 data and a two-stage econometric ap-
proach to estimate the effect of "competition" on the productive effi-
ciency of nuclear medicine services.20 In the first stage of the analysis
they estimated a "best-practice frontier" production function for nuclear
medical services. This technique identifies the maximum quantity of out-
put that can be produced with a given quantity of labor and capital in-
puts. Using the estimated best practice frontier, the authors computed an
"efficiency index" for each hospital. This index equaled the percentage
16. Joskow, supra note 15. at 432.
17. Joskow also included variables to control for the presence of both hospital rate
regulations and HMOs in the market, which have an unclear a priori impact on reserve
margins. Id. at 437-42.
18. This effect could occur because of an anticompetitive reduction in service quality
or because of scale economies. If fewer, larger hospitals exist, they may be able to econo-
mize on excess beds while offering the same probability that a bed will be available when
demanded. This is a typical outcome of inventory models.
19. Id. at 446.
20. George W. Wilson & Joseph M. Jadlow, Competition, Profit Incentives, and Techni-.
cal Efficiency in the Provision of Nuclear Medicine Services, 13 BELL J. ECON. 472 (1982).
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difference between the hospital's actual and'potential output. In the sec-
ond stage of the analysis, the authors asked whether interhospital varia-
tions in this efficiency index could be explained by the degree of
concentration in each hospital's service area, and by the hospital's profit/
nonprofit status. They found that low hospital concentration was associ-
ated with inefficient production.2' Wilson and Jadlow interpreted these
results as confirming the "wasteful nonprice competition" hypothesis pro-
posed by Joskow and others.
Using pooled cross section-time series data for the 1970-77 period, Far-
ley explored the impact of market structure on three separate aspects of
hospital performance: finances (e.g., "profitability"), case-mix, and re-
source usage.22 His results indicated that "competition" (as measured by
structural indices of concentration) is not associated with differences in
profitability, although it appears to increase expenses per admission. He
interpreted this result as evidence that competition among hospitals
raises costs. However, Farley did not explicitly control for exogenous
sources of cost differences (such as wage rates) that might be positively
correlated with his "competition" variable,' and the measured competi-
tion-cost relationship may not be robust to such an adjustment.
Farley found no relationship between market structure and a length-of-
stay-based case-mix index. He did find, however, evidence suggesting
(assuming that the case-mix index adequately controlled for severity of
illness) that patients having similar conditions are treated differently, de-
pending upon market structure. In particular, mean lengths-of-stay
tended to be longer in unconcentrated (and presumably more competi-
tive) markets. In addition, Farley found that hospitals in unconcentrated
markets tended to hold more unused bed capacity, offer a broader array
of diagnostic and therapeutic services, and employ more capital and more
21. In addition to the concentration index, Wilson and Jadlow's equation included
dummy variables for government and proprietary hospitals. Wilson and Jadlow's results
produced the anomalous finding that investor-owned hospitals were closer to the efficiency
frontier than were not-for-profit hospitals, yet competition between hospitals produced
waste.
22. DEAN E. FARLEY, PH.D., U.S. DEP'T HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PUB. No.
85-3353, COMPETITION AMONG HOSPITALS: MARKET STRUCTURE AND ITS RELATION TO
UTILIZATION, COSTS AND FINANCIAL POSTION, Research Note 7 (1985).
23. The more "competitive" markets are undoubtedly metropolitan areas, which are
sufficiently populous to support a large number of hospitals. Cost factors, such as wage
rates, tend to be higher (relative to rural areas) in these areas. Variation of this sort will be
controlled through the use of an "urban-rural" classification scheme. However, there is
also likely to be substantial variation between different urban areas. Farley did not control
for this type of variation.
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labor per adjusted admission than did institutions in more concentrated
areas. All of these results are consistent with the nonprice competition
hypotheses.
Consistent with the results obtained by Farley, Robinson et al. found
that increased competition (as measured by the number of "neighboring
hospitals") was positively related to length-of-stay.24 Using 1982 data on
747 short-term hospitals, the authors regressed length-of-stay for each of
ten medical/surgical procedures on variables measuring case-mix and pa-
tient characteristics, physician experience, population, population den-
sity, region, and teaching and ownership status. Their results indicated
that increasing the number of neighboring hospitals from none to eleven
or more in a fifteen-mile radius was associated with a seven to twenty-
three percent increase in length-of-stay.25
More evidence on the wasteful competition hypothesis was provided by
studies that focused on hospital costs. For example, while acknowledging
that price competition was of increasing importance, Robinson and Luft
hypothesized that hospital competition was still conducted -primarily
along nonprice dimensions.26 Because higher quality is costly to produce,
the assumed importance of nonprice competition leads to the prediction
that increased competition will contribute to higher pecuniary costs. Us-
ing 1972 data, Robinson and Luft indeed found that when other factors
27
are held constant, average costs per admission and per patient day in-
crease significantly with increases in the number of rival hospitals. Un-
like Joskow, however, they found that increases in the physician-
population ratio (which should reduce competition for staff physicians
and could therefore reduce costs) are associated with higher unit costs.
The authors conjectured that this variable may reflect an expansion in the
number of noncompeting subspecialties, rather than an increase in the
number of competing specialists. Based on these empirical findings,
24. James C. Robinson et al., Hospital Competition and Surgical Length of Stay, 259
JAMA 696 (1988).
25. Cf. James C. Robinson, HMO Market Penetration and Hospital Cost Inflation in
California, 266 JAMA 2719, 2722 (1991). In this 1991 study, Robinson found that the cost-
ameliorating effects of HMOs were greater in those markets where a larger number of
rivals existed. He implied that his earlier work using 1982 data could have been misleading
because during that period legal restraints on contracting may have kept hospitals and
HMOs from responding to competitive incentives.
26. James C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, The Impact of Hospital Market Structure on
Patient Volume, Average Length of Stay, and the Cost of Care, 4 J. HEALTH ECON. 333
(1985).
27. These other explanatory factors include number of admissions, average length-of-
stay, bed size, ownership status, size, and per capita income of the patient population.
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Robinson and Luft contended that "competitive" (or "market") strate-
gies may be of limited applicability as a means for containing health care
costs, and speculated that some degree of "cooperation" among rival hos-
pitals may be desirable as a means for reducing excess capacity.
.Using data from the same period, 1972, Luft et al. conducted a more
direct test of the nonprice competition hypothesis.28 They argued that if
hospitals in a particular geographic area are inclined to engage in
rivalrous behavior, an increase in the availability of a particular service by
neighboring hospitals will (other things constant) increase the likelihood
that any individual hospital in the area will offer the service. To test this
hypothesis, they performed a statistical analysis for twenty-nine clinical
services in which they attempted to explain the presence of a particular
service at an individual hospital by both the total number of competing
hospitals in the area and by the percentage of these competing hospitals
that offered the service.29 Their results indicated that the availability of a
service at an individual hospital is strongly (and positively) related to the
number of competitors also offering the service, but not to the absolute
number of competitors in the same basic location. From this, Luft et al.
inferred that the introduction of competition into hospital markets can
have an undesirable inflationary impact on hospital costs, since hospitals
will respond to entry through the addition of services and facilities.3"
Continuing the focus on average costs, Garnick et al. employed 1982
data on 504 California hospitals to assess the relationship between mar-
ket concentration and cost per admission. Three different techniques
were used to delineate geographic market boundaries.3 ' The first was
based on "geopolitical" distinctions (i.e., counties or SMSAs); the second
was derived from information on distances between hospitals (i.e., the
number of hospitals located within a fifteen-mile radius of a particular
location); the last utilized "patient origin" data.32 This yielded three sets
of concentration statistics.33 Each concentration index was then entered
as an explanatory variable in an equation that explained "average cost
28. Harold S. Luft et al., The Role of Specialized Clinical Services in Competition
Among Hospitals, 23 INQuIRY 83 (1986).
29. Examples of the services analyzed are mammography unit, cobalt therapy, heart
surgery, and emergency services.
30. This reaction to entry may benefit consumers as more and better services are of-
fered. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
31. Deborah W. Garnick et al., Appropriate Measures of Hospital Market Areas, 22
HEALTH SERVIcEs RES. 69 (1987).
32. Id. at 75-76.
33. Id. at 78-79.
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per admission."34 Garnick et al. found that when the first two market
definition techniques were used, there emerged a statistically significant
positive relationship between the proxies for competition (lower concen-
tration ratios) and costs. However, when the market boundaries were
established by the patient flow data, the observed relationship was nega-
tive (albeit statistically insignificant).
Expanding the work of Garnick et al. to a national sample, Robinson
and Luft examined the relationship between market structure and costs
using 1982 data on a sample of 5,732 hospitals.35 Market boundaries were
derived via the application of an algorithm that computed, for each hospi-
tal, the number of competing hospitals located within a fifteen-mile ra-
dius. 36 The corresponding concentration figures were entered into
regression equations whose dependent variables were cost per patient-
day and cost per admission. 37 Like Garnick et al., Robinson and Luft
found that for both cost measures, lower concentration was associated
with higher hospital costs. On the basis of these results, the authors con-
cluded that "a degree of caution [should] be exercised in predicting the
cost-reducing effects of recent 'market-oriented' policy initiatives.
38
It should be noted that Robinson and Luft used only one of the three
market definition techniques proposed by Garnick et al. Specifically,
Robinson and Luft did not construct concentration statistics correspond-
ing to markets defined by patient origin data.39 It will be recalled that
Garnick et al. did not obtain a positive relationship between competition
(lower concentration) and costs when the concentration variables were
derived in this fashion. It is unknown whether Robinson and Luft's prin-
cipal results would be invariant to this modification.
Each of the studies reviewed in this section, using pre-1983 data, found
that decreased hospital concentration was associated with increased unit
costs, increased length of stay, and increased production of health care
34. Other explanatory variables included hospital characteristics (i.e., bed size, owner-
ship, staff per bed), inpatient days in various units (i.e., case-mix), and socio-demographic
characteristics (i.e., physician/population ratio). Id. at 86.
35. James C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition and the Cost of Hospital Care,
1972 to 1982, 257 JAMA 3241 (1987).
36. This is the same procedure used by Garnick et al., supra note 31, at 72.
37. Robinson and Luft also included variables to control for variation in case-mix,
population characteristics, and input prices. They did not, however, include variables to
control for ownership-type or chain/nonchain status. Robinson & Luft, supra note 35, at
3242-43.
38. Id. at 3244 (emphasis in original).
39. See Garnick et al., supra note 31, at 76.
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services. These increases were characterized as socially wasteful, because
they raised the cost of providing a fixed quantity or quality of hospital
care.
B. More Recent Studies
Although the previous studies suggest that structural indices of compe-
tition were associated with increased health care costs and resource use,
more recent studies, using data from 1983 or later, provide a somewhat
different picture. These studies tend to focus on the experience of Cali-
fornia hospitals after the introduction of selective contracting in that
state. Selective contracting allowed third-party payers to exclude some
providers from participation in their programs if they chose to do so.
Continuing their examination of the effects of market structure on
costs, Robinson and Luft studied the effects of various state level hospital
regulatory policies from 1982 through 1986.40 Applying regression analy-
sis to a national sample of 5,490 hospitals, they compared the perform-
ance of California's "procompetition" policies with the rate regulation
strategies of Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey and New York.41 The
authors concluded that the two policies were equally effective in control-
ling changes in costs per admission in the short run.42 From a competi-
tion standpoint, their most interesting finding was that competition
appeared to reduce rates of cost inflation in these five states as well as
nationally. In addition, the rate regulation and procompetition policies
seemed to control costs better in local hospital markets where hospitals
faced a large number of rivals. California hospitals facing more than ten
rivals experienced increases in their costs per admission that were 22%
40. James C. Robinson & Harold S. Luft, Competition, Regulation, and Hospital Costs,
1982 to 1986, 260 JAMA 2676 (1988).
41. The authors used each hospital as an observation and regressed the logarithm of
changes in costs per admission from 1982 to 1986 on the logarithm of the 1982 levels and
the 1982 to 1986 changes in the levels of several independent variables. The explanatory
variables included the percentage of discharges by payer type (Medicare/Medicaid), aver-
age employee earnings, output measures (bed size, inpatient and outpatient visits, bed size
per admission, etc.), teaching status, ownership type, patient mix in six service categories,
number of neighboring hospitals, physician density, median income, population density,
and dummy variables indicating the form of state regulatory regime. Because the model
examines cost changes over a four year period, rather than levels of costs at a point in time,
a failure to explicitly adjust for quality variation across hospitals may not be as important
as in prior studies of hospital costs, if the quality of a given hospital does not change mark-
edly over time. Id.
42. Id. at 2680. The authors also found that hospitals with a high percentage of Medi-
care patients tend to exhibit significantly lower rates of cost increase than those hospitals
for whom Medicare is a less important payer. Id.
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below those experienced by hospitals that faced ten or fewer rivals.43
Similar results were obtained for the rate regulation states. In these
states, adjusted cost inflation rates ranged from 5.4 to 13.7 percentage
points lower (depending on the state) where hospitals faced more than
ten rivals.44 In the remaining forty-three states, increases in costs per ad-
mission were 9.1 percentage points lower where hospitals faced more
than ten competitors. 45 This evidence implies that competition may have
had a significant impact in reducing cost increases from 1982 to 1986. Be-
cause hospitals in high competition areas tended to have significantly
higher cost levels in 1982, however, those hospitals still exhibited signifi-
cantly higher 1986 cost levels than did hospitals that faced ten or fewer
rivals.
These results were corroborated to some extent by Melnick and Zwan-
ziger,46 who examined data for California hospitals from 1980 to 1985 and
found that after the introduction of selective contracting47 by third-party
payers in California in 1983, those hospitals in markets with many com-
petitors reduced their costs to more closely approximate the costs of hos-
pitals in less competitive markets.48 That is, average inpatient costs were
higher in more competitive markets both before and after the introduc-
tion of selective contracting, but the increases in costs per discharge were
3.5% lower in highly competitive markets (relative to hospitals in less
competitive markets) after the switch to selective contracting.49 Melnick
43. Id. at 2679.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Glenn A. Melnick & Jack Zwanziger, Hospital Behavior Under Competition and
Cost-Containment Policies: The California Experience 1980 to 1985, 269 JAMA 2669
(1988).
47. Melnick and Zwanziger argue that selective contracting was enhanced by a June
1982 California law that allowed third-party payers to exclude certain health care providers
from their lists of participating providers without significant fear-of antitrust prosecution.
Id. at 2669-70.
48. The authors used a multiple regression technique in which various inflation-ad-
justed measures of the annual percentage change in total cost, average cost, total revenue,
and utilization were regressed on dummy variables that indicate: (1) the competitiveness of
a market both before and after 1982; (2) the 1980 to 1982 period prior to selective con-
tracting; and (3) rural hospitals. Also included as an explanatory variable was a "financial
pressure" index based on the Medicare Prospective Payment $ystem's importance and
stringency for a particular hospital. Id. at 2670-71. Other studies by the authors yielded
similar results using a regression model that also included measures of labor input prices,
hospital size, and other hospital-specific factors in the estimating equation. See Jack
Zwanziger & Glenn A. Melnick, The Effects of Hospital Competition and the Medicare
PPS Program on Hospital Cost Behavior in California, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 301 (1988).
49. Melnick & Zwanziger, supra note 46, at 2673.
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and Zwanziger argued that as selective contracting spreads to other
states, we should observe similar effects of competition among hospitals.
Robinson and Phibbs also examined the changes in average costs ex-
perienced by hospitals in California following the change to selective con-
tracting.50 They measured the competitiveness of markets by counting
the number of rivals faced by each hospital when the market boundaries
were determined by flows of patients from different ZIP Code areas.
Markets with ten or fewer rivals were compared with those with eleven or
more rivals. The results implied, that a larger number of rivals was associ-
ated with a significantly lower rate of increase in both cost per admission
and cost per day.
51
In a study that did not focus on California alone, Hadley and Swartz
examined the impact of competition proxies on hospital costs using a gen-
eralized multi-payer cost function applied to data from forty-three SM-
SAs (1,293 hospitals) for 1980 through 1984.52 They found that
competition mattered, but that it did not matter very much. They argued
that the large cost reduction effects they observed were due to prospec-
tive payment schemes rather than to competition.53 Unfortunately, Had-
50. James C. Robinson & Ciaran Phibbs, An Evaluation of Medicaid Selective Con-
tracting in California, 8 J. HEALTH ECON. 437 (1989). The authors examined 262 private
hospitals in California between 1982 and 1986. They regressed changes in average costs or
length of stay on measures of changes in Medicare and MediCal shares, groupings of num-
bers of competitors (11 to 20, or 21 or more), changes in area demographics, hospital
wages, beds per admission, and eight types of services, as well as the hospital's contract
status. The number of competitors were measured in areas defined by patient flows from
various zip code areas. Id.
51. It appears that hospitals facing either 11 to 20 or 21 to 43 rivals exhibited lower
rates of cost increase than did those hospitals facing ten or fewer rivals. It did not appear
that the effect was significantly greater in the 21 to 43 competitor markets than in the 11 to
20 competitor markets, however.' It is possible that the effects measured here are due more
to urban/rural differences than to competition differences, because the urban/rural distinc-
tion was only indirectly incorporated in the regression model. Id. at 437-55.
52. Jack Hadley & Katherine Swartz, The Impacts on Hospital Costs Between 1980 and
1984 of Hospital Rate Regulation, Competition, and Changes in Health Insurance Coverage,
26 INQUIRY 35 (1989). The method used is essentially to estimate a multi-product cost
function where the products are defined by payer-type rather than by the type of service
provided. The cross-section/time-series model regressed total hospital expenses on Medi-
care and Medicaid admissions and patient days (entered linearly and squared), outpatient
surgical and other visits, full time equivalent residents, type of regulation or reimburse-
ment scheme, HMO prevalence,'insurance prevalence, physician density, year dummies,
public/private hospital type, case-mix, nurse and other wage indices, and capital costs and
energy costs per bed. An output function is also estimated. No tests for the appropriate-
ness of pooling are reported. The authors also do not report tests for autoregressive distur-
bances. Id.
53. This conclusion differs markedly from that of Zwanziger and Melnick, who found
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ley and Swartz were unable to measure competition reliably,54 and had to
rely on measures of HMO prevalence, physician density, and type of
ownership as proxies. Thus, as the authors conceded, the study is likely
to estimate incorrectly the effects of competition.5
Although studies of general hospital costs had dominated this literature
in the late 1980s, Dranove et al. returned to a more direct examination of
the effects of competition on the quantity of hospital services provided. 6
In response to much previous literature, they sought to answer the ques-
tion: "Do hospitals in more competitive environments really provide
more services than hospitals in less competitive markets?"57 Using data
on eleven groupings of 171 hospital services provided by 445 California
hospitals in 1983, the authors found that hospitals in more competitive
environments provide more services, but that the size of this effect is
quite small.5 They argued that the key factor in determining the number
of available services is simply the population of the area - a factor that
has been neglected in other examinations of hospital competition. In ad-
dition, the authors presented evidence that the provision of any particular
hospital service is likely to be significantly affected by the presence or
absence of scope economies among the various service groups.
5 9
that prospective payment systems had little independent effect on cost changes in Califor-
nia. See Zwanziger & Melnick, supra note 46, at 2674.
54. The Herfindahl index calculated at the SMSA level was always very low and was
statistically insignificant in the regressions. Hadley & Swartz, supra note 52, at 39-44.
55. Id. at 45.
56. David Dranove et al., Is Hospital Competition Wasteful?, 23 RAND J. ECON. 247
(1992).
57. This was the same kind of question examined earlier by a number of researchers.
See FARLEY, supra note 22; Harold S. Luft et al., The Role of Specialized Clinical Services
in Competition Among Hospitals, 23 INQUIRY 83 (1986); Robinson et al., supra note 24
(using data from earlier years). Dranove et al. only allude to the more basic question:
"Even if hospitals in competitive markets produced more services, would that be bad?"
Dranove et al., supra note 56.
58. The probit statistical model regresses the number of hospitals in area i providing
service j on the area population, the population of the adjacent fringe areas, distance to the
next more populated area, media income, wage costs for support personnel, and market
concentration. The authors chose to leave out hospital specific factors, arguing that they
are endogenous. The authors used "urbanized areas" as the geographic markets in which
to examine the effects of market concentration. As a result, hospitals in the larger urban
areas (i.e., Los Angeles and San Francisco) face hundreds of competitors. The authors
noted that exclusion of such markets from: the data does not alter the results appreciably.
Dranove et al., supra note 56, at 261.
59. Id. at 254-60.
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C. Summary
Much of the existing empirical evidence suggests that low concentra-
tion is associated with increased nonprice (quality) competition. Studies
published during the period of 1970 to 1987 indicate that low concentra-
tion was associated with higher costs and technically inefficient produc-
tion. The more recent evidence, however, suggests that areas with a
relatively large number of competing hospitals have lower rates of cost
inflation than do areas where there are fewer competitors. In addition,
the evidence of "overproduction" of health services in unconcentrated
markets is less apparent in the more recent studies.
IV. EMPIRICAL LINKS BETWEEN MARKET STRUCTURE AND PRICES
Although there has been a considerable amount of research on the re-
lationship between hospital costs and market structure, less emphasis has
been placed on exploring the relationship between market structure and
hospital prices. Two studies using data from the 1970s indicate that price
competition among hospitals existed even in that early period.
One study was performed by Noether in 1987.60 Noether estimated
two basic regression equations. In the first, the price of a particular hos-
pital service" was estimated as a function of a set of exogenous demand,
factor price, and market structure variables. In the second, expenses per
admission were regressed on the same explanatory factors.62 Market
structure should affect expenses only through its effect on quality compe-
tition, but will influence price both indirectly (i.e., through its effects on
quality competition) as well as directly (i.e., explicit price competition).
Therefore, Noether argued that differences in the magnitudes of the mar-
ket structure parameters in the price and cost equations should indicate
the nature of competition (i.e., price versus nonprice) that is most preva-
lent in hospital markets.
63
Noether's results suggested that both quality and price competition oc-
cur in the hospital industry. The market concentration variable generally
60. Monica Noether, Competition Among Hospitals, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 259 (1988).
61. Noether used 1977 price data for eleven disease categories. Id. at 261-70.
62. The expense data, unlike the price data, were not disaggregated by disease cate-
gory, and may thus suffer from unmeasured differences in disease severity. Noether at-
tempted to control for this by including as explanatory variables hospital characteristics
(such as whether the facility was a teaching hospital) that are thought to affect case-mix.
Id.
63. Id. at 278-79.
19941
134 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 10:117
exhibited a significant negative effect on expenses per admission' (indi-
cating that hospitals in concentrated markets engage in less quality com-
petition),65 but exercised no significant direct influence on price. If
hospitals did not engage in price competition, we would expect to find
both prices and expenses increasing with concentration. The results ob-
tained in this study suggest that the cost-increasing impact of competition
is offset by its price-reducing impact.
Frech and Woolley examined the effects of SMSA hospital concentra-
tion on average prices, costs, and markups for various hospital services
(room and board and certain laboratory services).6 6 They found that in-
creased concentration is associated with higher hospital laboratory
charges. 67 They also found that increased concentration lowered average
costs more than it lowered average prices. They argued (as did Noether)
that this could imply that higher concentration is associated with a higher
quality-adjusted price of hospital care. Frech and Woolley also concluded
that the effect of concentration on prices implies that price competition
existed between hospitals as early as 1970.
64. Id. at 270-78. Noether also examined the relationship between market structure
and intensity of input use. The results showed that higher levels of concentration reduce
the number of employees hired per bed, as well as the quantity of assets employed per bed.
Id. at 278.
65. An alternative explanation for this result is that efficient (low cost) hospitals gain
large market shares, which increases measured concentration. This rationale may not be
valid in this case, since Noether included a separate firm-size variable that should have
captured any size-related efficiency effects. Id. at 273.
66. H. Frech, III & J. Michael Woolley, Consumer Information, Price and Nonprice
Competition Among Hospitals (Dec. 1988) (unpublished mimeograph, on file with the
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy).
67. The authors aggregated the 1970 hospital data to 170 SMSA level observations and
regressed the average price (and cost) variables on concentration, mean income, insurance
coverage, population and other demographics, for-profit and government hospital preva-
lence, nursing wages, housing costs, average patient length-of-stay, hospital unionization,
certificate-of-need law age, Blue Cross market share, proportion of beds in medical school-
affiliated hospitals, and local government health care expenditures per capita. All mone-
tary variables were adjusted by a 1978 SMSA cost of living index. The authors also in-
cluded three proxies for the level of information that consumers might have regarding
hospital prices and quality. These variables included: percent of households with a female
head, the percent of housing units moved into during the past five years, and proportion of
households with a phone available. The coefficients on the information variables as a
group were often statistically significant. Individually, however, they were either statisti-
cally insignificant or they obtained the wrong sign. The coefficients on the for-profit and
government variables were generally insignificant. Id.
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A. The California Experiment and Prices
We previously mentioned four studies that examined the effects of
competition on hospital costs and resource utilization using post-1982
California data."s These studies tend to indicate that cost increases were
lower in those areas where more competitors existed. TWo studies have
also recently examined the effects of hospital market concentration on
the prices charged by California hospitals.
In the first such study, Dranove, Shanley, and White examined the ef-
fects of hospital market concentration on prices charged by hospitals to
private pay patients. They studied 300 nongovernment hospitals in Cali-
fornia between 1983 and 1988, a period when selective contracting be-
tween health care plans and health care providers was allowed and. when
HMOs grew from 24% to 80% of the private insurance market in Califor-
nia.69 They found a statistically significant and economically nontrivial
positive effect of concentration on both net markups and transaction
prices. They argued that standard merger analysis should probably be
applied to hospitals given that the direction of the concentration effect is
consistent with that found in markets for other goods and services.7°
Continuing with the California experiment, Melnick, Zwanziger,
Bamezai, and Pattison examined the effects of hospital concentration on
prices charged by hospitals to the Blue Cross (BC) PPO in California in
1987.71 They found that BC paid lower prices for medical/surgical bed
68. See supra notes 40-59 and accompanying text.
69. David Dranove et al., Price and Concentration in Hospital Markets: The Switch
from Patient-Driven to Payor-Driven Competition, 36 J.L. & ECON. (1993). The authors
examined several dependent variables including net hospital markups, list price markups,
estimated average transaction prices, aggregate markups, and intensity of in-patient clinical
lab use. Each dependent variable was based on data weighted by eight profit centers for
each hospital. The dependent variables were regressed on Herfindahl concentration indi-
ces and several hospital characteristics including: hospital market share, a hospital size
dummy variable based on 300 beds, "high tech" status, fixed asset intensity, Medicaid and
Medicare funding intensity, and bad debt and charity revenues. The markets were defined
by Census Bureau urban areas rather than by patient flows. Given the level of aggrega-
tion, the prices do not correspond to prices for any particular service or illness treatment,
but rather are aggregated prices across a basket of eight common cost and profit centers
(i.e., med/surg acute care, clinical lab, diagnostic radiology, etc.) with relatively little spe-
cific adjustment for case-mix.
70. An interesting finding by Dranove et al. is that certain hospital profit centers oper-
ate at large negative markups. This implies that these services (intensive care and medical/
surgical beds) must be complements to the hospital's other services and cannot be analyzed
in isolation. Id.
71. Glenn A. Melnick et al., The Effects of Market Structure and Bargaining Position
on Hospital Prices, 11 J. HEALTh ECON. 217 (1992).
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days in those markets where there were more competing hospitals.72 The
regression analysis indicated that a merger leading to a 50% increase in
the concentration measure would be associated with a 9% increase in
price.73 The authors also found that, where a hospital handled a larger
share of BC customers, BC paid higher prices; and where BC provided a
larger share of a hospital's patient days, BC paid relatively low prices.74
Thus, the relative bargaining strengths of the hospital and the PPO appar-
ently are significant. The authors argue that excess hospital capacity must
exist in the market for the PPO to maintain a credible threat to move
patients to alternative hospitals.75 Without such a threat, the PPO cannot
elicit lower prices from the hospitals. I
B. Studies of Mergers and Hospital Pricing
Eisenstadt and Klass examined evidence from mergers of not-for-profit
hospitals in small towns for 1985 and 1986.76 They compared the price
changes (for standard diagnosis groups) in seven markets that had exper-
ienced mergers with the price changes that occurred in similar markets
that had not experienced mergers. They estimated several equations that,
as a group, indicated that there was no statistically significant relationship
between hospital price increases and the occurrence of a merger.77 In
addition, Eisenstadt and Klass used MEDPAR price data from thirty
Pennsylvania hospitals (for thirteen common diagnosis groups) to ex-
72. Id. at 227. The model regresses the Blue Cross PPO's negotiated price per inpa-
tient medical/surgical day on market structure (Herfindahl concentration indexes for mar-
kets based on either patient-flow data or county boundaries), hospital characteristics (prior
year's cost index relative to that for all hospitals (to control for product differences), teach-
ing status, ownership-type dummies), and market position variables (Blue Cross share of
inpatient days, hospital occupancy rate, average hospital occupancy in the market, the hos-
pital's share of all Blue Cross days within the market). The authors also test and correct
for the endogeneity of the market share variables. Id. at 225-29.
73. Id. at 229.
74. Id. at 230.
75. Id.
76. D. Eisenstadt & M. Klass, The Relationship Between Non-Profit Hospital Market
Structure and Economic Performance: Evidence from Pennsylvania and from Non-Profit
Hospital Consolidations 10-20 (1988) (unpublished mimeograph, on file with ICF Consult-
ing Associates).
77. Because all data came from small town markets, each market tended to be highly
concentrated both before and after the merger. The time series regression analysis did not
adjust for any factors other than the existence of the merger. Control was accomplished by
pairing the merger cities with comparison markets chosen to match in market structure and
location. Since the post-merger periods tended to be rather short, the results could not be
expected to be too informative. Id.
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amine the relationship between price and market concentration.78 They
reported that in 1986, increased concentration was associated with lower
prices for all thirteen diagnosis related groups (DRGs), and that this ef-
fect was statistically significant in four instances. 79 They also found no
relationship between concentration and their measures of cost per admis-
sion or quality.8 °
An indirect test of the impact of market structure on pricing behavior
was conducted by Woolley, who performed an "event study" of the im-
pact of hospital mergers.8 ' Event studies utilize the assumption of effi-
cient financial markets (i.e., the notion that the price of a firm's stock
reflects all available information bearing on the expected future profit-
ability of the firm) to assess the perceived consequences of mergers and
acquisitions. Using data for hospital mergers during the 1969-85 period,
Woolley reported that "promerger" events (e.g., a merger announce-
ment) tended to increase "rivals" market value, while "antimerger"
events (e.g., the announcement of an antitrust complaint) reduced market
value.82 Woolley characterized this pattern of results as consistent with
traditional views of market competition (i.e., mergers lead to supracom-
petitive prices, hence monopoly rents for rivals, while antitrust actions
eliminate these rents).83
We do not share Woolley's interpretation of these findings. Vita and
Schumann carefully examined fifteen of the post-1980 events in Woolley's
sample.' They found that all of these events fall into at least one of the
78. The sample was small because the study was designed to examine only small city
hospitals in Pennsylvania where relatively high market concentration existed. The authors
used multiple regression techniques to examine factors affecting prices, average costs and
hospital quality. The models adjusted for concentration, for-profit status, management
contracts, system affiliation, service to HMO or PPO members, hospital wage rates, case-
mix, teaching hospital affiliation, bed size, length-of-stay for a DRG and overall, and the
prevalence of "birthing services." Id.
79. Id.
80. Measures of quality included the percentage of patients who died while in the care
of the hospital, and the percentage of cases with blood transfusion complications or surgi-
cal complications. Id.
81. J. Michael Woolley, The Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers in the Hospital
Industry: An Even Closer Look, 10 J. HEALTH ECON. 373 (1991) [hereinafter Woolley 2]; J.
Michael Woolley, The Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers in the Hospital Industry, 8
J. HEALTH ECON. 271 (1989) [hereinafter Woolley 1].
82. Woolley 1, supra note 81, at 282-84. "Rivals" were defined to consist of other
investor-owned chains, even though not-for-profit independent hospitals have a signifi-
cantly greater market share. Id.
83. Id. at 285.
84. M. Vita & L. Schumann, The Competitive Effects of Horizontal Mergers in the
Hospital Industry: A Closer Look, 10 J. HEALTH ECON. 359 (1991).
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following three categories: (1) the transaction was not truly horizontal;
(2) the transaction was horizontal, but generated a concentration increase
too small to plausibly produce market power; or (3) the transaction might
have created market power, but could not have conferred monopoly re-
turns on firms improperly characterized as rivals.8 5 Vita and Schumann
suggested an alternative rationale for Woolley's findings; i.e., the sample
transactions conveyed information to other firms about the existence of
merger-related efficiencies.
8 6
C. Other Market Structure and Pricing Evidence
Feldman and Dowd employed a different approach to measuring the
market power of hospitals."' Using 1981 data on thirty-one Twin Cities
hospitals, the authors estimated the price elasticity of hospital demand for
three different payer groups: Medicare, Medicaid, and private pay. Not
surprisingly, they found that each group's demand is less than perfectly
elastic. They concluded from this result that the Twin Cities hospital mar-
ket was not competitive. 8 We believe, however, that this conclusion does
not follow from their empirical findings. The measure of an individual
firm's market power is the elasticity of the residual demand curve facing
the firm. This elasticity is determined by the firm's market share, market
demand elasticity, and fringe supply elasticity. 9 To estimate whether in-
dividual firms have unilateral market power, one must estimate a demand
curve for each firm. 90 Feldman and Dowd did not do this; rather, they
estimated the demand curves for separate groups of consumers (which,
when aggregated, yield the market demand curve). They found that all
groups exhibited inelastic demands. This implies that overall market de-
mand may respond very little to price changes (a highly inelastic de-
mand). However, an individual firm may lose virtually all its sales if it
85. Id.
86. Id. at 371.
87. Roger Feldman & Bryan Dowd, Is There a Competitive Market for Hospital Serv-
ices?, 5 J. HEALTH ECON. 277 (1986).
88. Id. at 291.
89. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94
HARV. L. REV. 937, 944 (1991).
90. For empirical examples, see Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, The
Gains from Merger or Collusion in Product-Differentiated Industries, 33 J. INDUs. ECON.
427 (1985); David T. Scheffman & Pablo T. Spiller, Geographic Market Definition under
the U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 30 JL. & ECON. 123 (1987); Jonathan B.
Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, Estimating the Elasticity of Demand Facing a Single Firm:
Evidence on Three Brewing Firms (1984) (unpublished research paper, Dept. of Econom-
ics, Stanford University).
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raises price even a small amount (the firm faces a perfectly elastic
residual demand curve). 9 ' One could infer from Feldman and Dowd's
results that Twin Cities hospitals would find it profitable to collude (as-
suming that they could coordinate their behavior). One could also infer
(assuming coordination) that they would find it profitable to charge dif-
ferent prices to different consumer groups (i.e., price discriminate). In-
ferences about unilateral market power, however, cannot be made from
Feldman and Dowd's empirical findings.92
The evidence for Florida hospitals has recently been analyzed by the
Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board' (HCCCB).93 The HCCCB
focused on 201 Florida hospitals from 1984 through 1990 and argued that
higher market concentration was associated with lower average revenues
and lower average costs.9 4 The coefficients from the empirical analysis
imply, however, that competition may indeed work. While the HCCCB
found that the level of concentration (apparently measured in 1984) had
no significant relationship to rates of change in average revenues or costs,
the change in concentration over the period was positively associated
with rates of increase in costs and revenues. This latter evidence implies
that rising levels of concentration lead to higher costs and prices, while
falling levels of concentration lead to lower costs and prices.
Overall, the empirical studies relating hospital concentration to pricing
behavior present a mixture of results that do not lend themselves to de-
91. As an illustration, consider the demand for wheat. It is probably true that a gen-
eral rise in the price of wheat will not cause a large reduction in total wheat consumption
(i.e., the market demand for wheat is inelastic). However, if any individual wheat producer
increased his price alone, he would lose virtually all his sales as rival wheat producers
increase their sales at the previous price (i.e., the residual demand facing any single pro-
ducer is highly elastic).
92. See also Roger Feldman et al., Effects of HMOs on the Creation of Competitive
Markets for Hospital Services, 9 J. HEALTH ECON. 207 (1990) (similarly interpreting regres-
sion results in an examination of HMO behavior in choosing hospitals).
93. HEALTH CARE COST CONTAINMENT BOARD, STATE OF FLORIDA, DIMENSIONS OF
LOCAL COMPETITION IN FLORIDA 1984-1990 (1992) [hereinafter FLORIDA STUDY].
94. Id. at 27. The HCCCB study examined gross and net revenues per admission and
costs per admission. These variables were regressed on market concentration (using mar-
kets defined by patient flow data), surgi-center competition, hospital characteristics (aver-
age daily census, HMO/PPO funding, Medicare funding, ownership type, input prices,
service index, case-mix index, teaching status), and some area demographics (physicians
per thousand population). The study used a stepwise statistical procedure to choose the
various models. This procedure may lead to statistical bias in the estimates of the coeffi-
cients if it results in the deletion of relevant explanatory variables that are correlated with
the included variables. The authors present little information on the sensitivity of the coef-
ficients to the exclusion of potentially relevant variables and one must, therefore, place less
emphasis on the results than might otherwise be the case.
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finitive conclusions. Those studies that use the most defensible methods,
however (with one exception), show that price competition does exist
among hospitals and that a positive relationship exists between market
concentration and prices.95
V. INTERPRETATION OF THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The empirical studies surveyed in the previous section provide fairly
strong evidence that nonprice competition has traditionally been an im-
portant element of hospital competition. In and of itself, this does not
suggest market failure. Markets for virtually all goods and services ex-
hibit a mixture of price and quality competition. Pure price competition
is the exception rather than the rule. Given a choice between low quality,
low price goods, and high quality, high price goods, consumers will often
voluntarily choose the latter. Total (and average) expenditures on the
good may rise as a result, yet few would construe this as evidence of a
market failure or suggest that collusion to reduce quality is desirable.96
Indeed, the standard analyses of quality competition find that competi-
tive markets tend to produce efficient (i.e., welfare maximizing) levels of
both quality and quantity.97 Nevertheless, many discussions of hospital
competition conclude that quality competition reduces social welfare."
95. Several studies indicate that competition "works" in the sense that lower concen-
tration is associated with lower prices. See Dranove, supra note 69; Frech, supra note 66;
Melnick, supra note 71; MONICA NOETHER, FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMPETITION AMONG
HOSPITALS (1987). Others find that hospital competition does not "work" in that de-
creased concentration is associated with higher prices. See FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 93;
Feldman & Dowd, supra note 87; Eisenstadt & Klass, supra note 76. Of the latter group of
studies, however, only the Eisenstadt & Klass paper used a method that was likely to shed
light reliably on the questions the papers attempted to address.
96. Such collusive behavior might violate the antitrust laws. Most known episodes of
collusion in hospital markets focused on easily observable output such as services or beds
and not on the arguably more complex pricing dimension. Frech & Woolley, supra note 66.
97. See, e.g., K. Leffler, Ambiguous Changes in Product Quality, 72 AM. ECON. REV.
956 (1982).
98. See, e.g., Catherine G. McLaughlin, Market Responses to HMOs: Price Competi-
tion or Rivalry?, 25 INOUIRY 207 (1988); Robinson, supra note 1. There is one sense in
which a positive relationship between total expenditures and competition could be con-
strued as providing evidence of waste, even in a world with good information. Suppose
firms compete (and therefore seek to collude) on both price and nonprice ("quality") ba-
ses. If collusion over quality tends to break down more rapidly than price collusion as
concentration falls, then unit costs will rise as firms compete for the monopoly rents
through quality improvements. See George J. Stigler, Barriers to Entry, Economies of
Scale, and Firm Size, in THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67-70 (1983). These additional
expenditures could be characterized as "wasteful," in that they exceed the levels that
would be obtained in a completely noncollusive environment. In such an instance, con-
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The basis for this conclusion is not always articulated, although it presum-
ably derives from the consumer and provider incentive incompatibilities
created by health care insurance and the information asymmetries dis-
cussed earlier. These problems would tend to reduce the efficiency of the
market irrespective of whether competition occurs mainly on price or
nonprice dimensions. The discussions of health care markets generally
conclude that competition cannot be relied upon to assure allocatively
efficient outcomes in the health care sector. An obvious corollary to such
a conclusion is that the traditional antitrust analysis of horizontal mergers
is not applicable to hospitals.
Can this policy conclusion be supported by empirical evidence on the
relationship between concentration and hospital costs? We do not be-
lieve that studies of this type can support such an inference. Ideally, one
should measure allocative efficiency in a market by comparing the margi-
nal social value of an additional unit of output (or quality) to the margi-
nal social cost of producing that unit. Both quantity (and quality) levels
are efficient when these marginal values equal their marginal costs.
There is insufficient quantity (or quality) when marginal value exceeds
marginal cost; there is excessive quantity (or quality) when the marginal
cost exceeds marginal value. If one wishes to assess whether particular
market conditions are conducive to optimal economic performance, a
sensible research strategy would therefore be to develop empirical prox-
ies for marginal value and marginal cost, and estimate their relationship
to the market structure variables of interest (such as concentration).
There is a vast amount of industrial organization literature in which this
approach has been employed. 99 This literature does not attempt to ad-
dress resource allocation questions by examining only the behavior of
unit (or even marginal) costs, because, by themselves, cost data provide
only part of the information necessary for welfare calculations. 1°°
Regardless of its flaws, the research strategy used in the industrial or-
sumer welfare would be maximized, however, not by enforcing quality collusion, but by
eliminating all forms of collusion from the market.
99. For a review of this literature, see Paul A. Pautler, A Review of the Economic Basis
for Broad-Based Horizontal-Merger Policy, 28 ANTrrRUST BULL. 571 (1983). While the
literature in industrial organization is imperfect in several respects, it does attempt to an-
swer the correct questions. The hospital competition literature, most especially in its early
stages, does not answer these questions.
100. Indeed, one suspects that in markets where both price and quality competition
occur, cross-sectional regressions would often show a positive relationship between unit
costs and competition, as we often observe in hospitals. However, such a result would
seldom, if ever, be construed as evidence of systematic market failure.
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ganization literature would represent a substantial improvement upon the
techniques used in most early studies of hospital competition. The only
obvious distinction between studies of the hospital industry and those of
other industries is that, while students of other industries are usually
searching for evidence of insufficient output (i.e., monopoly power), hos-
pital researchers typically are testing hypotheses about excessive output
(or quality). But, as we have seen, the early health care researchers did
not (with few exceptions) adopt this approach. Rather, they attempted to
analyze structure-performance relationships in hospital markets mainly
through an analysis of unit costs, despite the fact that this research design
is singularly unsuited to generating insights into resource allocation and
consumer welfare issues. Those authors who, more recently., have ex-
amined the joint behavior of costs and prices using better empirical meth-
ods, have tended to find that price competition exists and that the
"standard" result holds - lower market concentration is associated with
lower hospital price increases. While their results cannot be construed as
evidence that hospital output and quality levels are "optimal," the more
recent studies suggest nonetheless that hospital markets respond to nor-
mal competitive forces. To that extent, these newer studies of hospital
competition support the application of competition policies to health care
markets.
We do not argue that incentive incompatibilities have been eliminated
from health care markets. Nevertheless, while the existence of incentive
incompatibilities might induce departures from the "first best" competi-
tive equilibrium, their presence does not establish the proposition that
quantity and quality levels arrived at through collusion are socially pref-
erable to those obtained through an admittedly imperfect market. 1 ' This
is true whether the collusion occurs tacitly or explicitly (e.g., under the
auspices of a planning agency). Advocates of collusive (or regulatory)
allocation mechanisms presumably should bear the burden of proving
that society would benefit if health care resources were allocated by these
mechanisms rather than by markets. That burden has not yet been satis-
fied by existing empirical research; indeed, the most recent research often
contradicts this position.
10 2
101. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1969).
102. We have intentionally not addressed two issues that often gets intertwined in the
debate over "competition" versus "regulation." Namely, whether relatively healthy per-
sons should be forced to subsidize relatively sickly persons, and whether the insurance
system can (or should) be used as a wealth transfer mechanism to make medical care avail-
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One additional point should be noted. Many of the empirical studies
discussed in the preceding section were based upon pre-1982 data. Dra-
matic changes in reimbursement, production, and delivery have taken
place during the past decade. Many of these developments represent an
endogenous market response to principal-agent problems. The (in-
tended) effect of many of these transformations has been to confront
health care consumers (or their agents) with prices that reflect production
costs and thereby diminish incentives to overconsume health care serv-
ices. This, in turn, will furnish providers with an incentive to compete on
price and, accordingly, to reduce costs. Indeed, most of the hospital com-
petition studies that employed post-1982 data are more sanguine about
the effects of competition on unit costs (or intertemporal changes in unit
cost) and prices than were earlier studies." 3
Because the information upon which formal analyses of hospital com-
petition are based becomes available with a time lag, researchers only
now are beginning to study the data generated during this recent innova-
tive period."° Consequently, conjectures on the ultimate competitive im-
pact of these advances can be based on two information sources. The
first source is the anecdotal information contained in the hospital trade
press. The other is the set of empirical studies that is based on data gen-
erated in those areas where the aforementioned innovations seem to have
taken hold and rapidly diffused. In the ensuing section, we discuss first
the various transformations that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s and
review the impact that these developments were predicted to have had on
hospital competition. We then survey the currently available econometric
evidence to assess whether these innovations have, in fact, had their in-
tended procompetitive effects.
able to all citizens regardless of ability to pay. Those issues are beyond the scope of this
paper and are distributional issues that are logically (if not emotionally) separable from the
question of whether competition or regulation more efficiently produces a particular level
of health care output.
103. See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 25; Zwanziger & Melnick, supra note 48; Melnick &
Zwanziger, supra note 46; Dranove et al., supra note 56.
104. In an oft-cited legal decision in this area, Judge Posner noted that the literature
relating hospital concentration to prices and competition "is at an early and inconclusive
stage ...." United States v. Rockford Mem. Corp., 898 F.2d 1278, 1286 (7th Cir. 1990).
For several differing views on the state of this literature, see Paul J. Feldstein et al., Con-
centration and Price in the Hospital Industry: Prices Are Lower in Competitive Markets, 22
ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REV. 55 (1991).
1994]
144 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 10:117
V. COMPETITIVE DEVELOPMENTS IN HEALTH CARE FINANCING AND
DELIVERY
The principal focus of most of the innovations in health care finance
has been to confront decisionmakers, whether patients or physicians (act-
ing as patients' agents), with prices that reflect the costs of increased con-
sumption. Presumably, the establishment of such a pricing structure will
induce the decisionmakers to weigh carefully incremental costs against
expected benefits when making consumption choices. If this occurs, one
would expect to observe a commensurate increase in providers' propen-
sity to compete on price. There are two primary changes that have been
introduced to achieve this end. The first is the reformulation of tradi-
tional indemnity plans to increase subscribers' out-of-pocket payments,
and the second is the development of plans that reward providers for
constraining the quantity of services provided.
As Noether notes, much of the impetus for the reformulation of tradi-
tional indemnity plans has come from employers, who have seen their
insurance premiums steadily grow over the past two decades." 5 To re-
duce this growth, many firms have adopted plans that incorporate larger
deductibles, mandatory second opinions, and higher coinsurance rates." 6
In 1982, for example, only 17% of private companies required the pay-
ment of deductibles; by 1984 the number had grown to 52%. In 1984 only
50% of firms fully reimbursed policy-holders for hospital room and board
expenses, whereas in 1979 the corresponding figure was 89%. The
number of firms providing full coverage for surgery expenses has also
fallen since 1979, declining from 45% to 27%." °
This reduction in the share of health care expenses covered by tradi-
tional indemnity plans is significant, given the large percentage of the
population covered by these plans. Perhaps equally important is the ad-
vent and growth of nontraditional "managed care" plans, such as HMOs
and PPOs, which alter the incentives of health care providers and con-
sumers. As we will see, however, the impact of these plans on the price,
quantity, and quality of health care is controversial.
105. NOETHER, supra note 95, at 84.
106. A plan's deductible is the amount that the subscriber must bear before the plan
will reimburse any expenditures. The coinsurance rate is the percentage of expenses (in
excess of the deductible) that must be absorbed by the patient. For evidence regarding the
growth of cost control devices such as preadmission certification, second opinions before
surgery, and increased deductibles, see Steven DiCarlo & Jon Gabel, Conventional Health
Plans: A Decade Later, 10 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 77 (1989).
107. See Robert Pear, Companies Tackle Health Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1985, at Fit.
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A. Effects of Coinsurance and Deductibles
There is evidence that altering the completeness of insurance coverage,
or the form of insurance reimbursement, can substantially alter consump-
tion behavior. As part of a RAND Corporation study, Manning et al.
found that consumers who had to pay higher out-of-pocket costs for serv-
ices were sensitive to price changes.'08 In particular, they estimated non-
trivial (albeit low) market demand elasticities for medical care of about -
0.2.109 The largest percentage reductions in consumption occurred when
the coinsurance rate was increased from 0 to 25%. Raising the co insur-
ance rate from 0 to 95% (but capping total personal contributions at
$1,000) led to a 46% reduction in total predicted health care
expenditures." 0
In another study based on the same RAND data set, Siu et al. found
that the imposition of cost sharing for in- and out-patient services induced
declines in both the number of admissions and the number of inpatient
days."' The percentage decline in the number of "appropriate" admis-
sions (and days) was similar to the rate of decline of the number of "inap-
propriate" admissions (and days), where "appropriateness" was
determined by reference to a well-established medical protocol. Siu et al.
concluded that strategies directed specifically at reducing "inappropriate"
admissions could yield substantial resource savings." 2
In a more recent study that is generally consistent with the RAND re-
sults, Cherkin et al. examined the effects of an inexpensive ($5) office
visit copayment imposed in 1985 on a group of Washington state employ-
ees enrolled in an HMO." 3 Federal employees enrolled in the same
HMO were not subject to the copayment and served as a control group.
The authors found that the small copayments had no effect on the use of
various child immunizations, hypertension drug use, and cancer screening
therapies. These copayments did, however, reduce the use of general
108. Manning et al., supra note 11.
109. Id. at 268.
110. Id. at 260. The RAND study found that most cost savings were attributable to
reductions in the likelihood of admission with higher coinsurance rates; however, the
RAND researchers found few insurance-induced differences in resource use once admis-
sion occurs.
111. Albert L. Siu et al., Inappropriate Use of Hospitals in a Randomized Trial of Health
Insurance Plans, 315 NEW ENr. J. MED. 1259 (1986).
112. Id.
113. D. Cherkin et al., The Effect of Office Visit Copayments on Preventative Care Serv-
ices in an HMO, 27 INQUIRY 24 (1990).
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medical exams by about 14%."11
One recent study provides mixed results regarding the effects of copay-
ments and deductibles on the demand for ambulatory surgery. Pauly and
Erder used a large data set from one private insurer who offered multiple
insurance plans to seven large companies. 115 The authors found that in-
surance plans offering copayment and deductible terms making ambula-
tory surgery cheaper than in-patient surgery do not appear to induce
more ambulatory surgery. They did find, however, that surgery rates gen-
erally are lower when out-of-pocket costs are higher for the insureds."16
So insurance incentives seem to affect surgery generally, but they do not
matter in determining whether the surgery occurs in an ambulatory set-
ting or in a hospital in-patient setting. The authors offered no particularly
compelling rationale for the lack of a price effect for ambulatory surgery.
The potential effects of insurance were indirectly revealed in another
study that examined the sensitivity of consumers to prices charged by in-
dividual hospitals." 7 Luft et al. found evidence from a logistic hospital
choice model that the price elasticity of demand faced by an individual
hospital may range from -0.5 to -1.4.111 These values indicate a relatively
low responsiveness of consumers to price when distance to a hospital and
hospital quality are held constant. These estimates must be interpreted
cautiously, however. First, the price data used in this study (and others
like it)" 9 likely do not correspond to the prices facing the entities actually
making the choices. 'Ipically, the price data consist of information on
"charges," which may be only vaguely related to the actual prices faced
by the person making the choice of hospital. Additionally, it is often dif-
ficult to identify the entity making the choice. It could be the doctor, the
patient, the employer, or a third party carrier.
Second, this study in all likelihood suffers from a problem frequently
encountered in empirical studies of consumer demand. 2 ° The problem
arises because the consumers' choice is in part determined by some factor
(e.g.,* "quality") that is not observed or measured by the researcher. If
114. Id.
115. M. Pauly & M. Erder, Insurance Incentives for Ambulatory Surgery, 27 HEALTH
SERVICES RES. 813 (1993).
116. Id.
117. Harold S. Luft et al., Does Quality Influence Choice of Hospital?, 263 JAMA 2899
(1990).
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Feldman et al., supra note 92.
120. See Hal R. 'Varian, Econometrics and Economic Theory, in MICROECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 118-35 (1978).
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"quality" is correlated with price (i.e., higher quality hospitals charge
higher prices), this omission will cause the researcher systematically to
underestimate consumers' sensitivity to changes in price.
B. Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs)
The incorporation of deductibles and coinsurance into traditional in-
demnity plans constitutes an attempt to induce the ultimate consumers of
health care services to reduce their consumption of these services. How-
ever, because many consumption decisions are made by physicians acting
as agents for their patients, another strategy for altering incentives has
been the vertical integration of the health insurance and health care de-
livery functions. Although this integration can take a variety of forms,
perhaps the best known organizational configuration is the closed-panel
HMO. Such HMOs typically have their own in-house medical staff and
facilities. An HMO subscriber pays a fixed premium to the organization,
which in turn provides the subscriber with comprehensive health care
services.12 1 The incentive to control utilization is clear. Because the or-
ganization is operating, on a fixed budget, any costs in excess of this
amount will constitute financial losses (and, conversely, low costs will
generate profits). If the compensation of HMO physicians is linked to
these profits and losses, the physicians will no longer have incentives to
treat health care services as "free" goods, as traditional "fee-for-service"
providers allegedly do, and will accordingly have an incentive to exercise
considerably more discretion when making consumption decisions on be-
half of their patients. If HMOs are successful in altering physician behav-
ior, then utilization of health care resources should decline, leading to
cost reductions for HMOs.1 2 2 HMOs should then be able to charge less
for insurance. This process implies that HMOs may provide health care
services with fewer resources (and of potentially lower quality) than do
traditional plans. Consumers of health care services then have a choice of
the resource-intensive traditional system or the HMO system. If HMOs
grow relative to traditional insurance systems, then consumers must per-
ceive them to be a superior alternative to the traditional system.
123
121. In most cases where the HMO cannot provide the service itself (e.g., most HMOs
do not own their own hospitals), the patient generally must obtain care from an institution
that has been approved by the HMO.
122. See David Dranove, supra note 8 (discussing a model of physician demand induce-
ment that illustrates the potential benefits of HMO incentive structures in reducing "un-
necessary" treatment).
. 123. If consumers can evaluate the quality of the care they receive, then the growth of
HMOs would imply that they are clearly a superior alternative to traditional plans for
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Health maintenance organizations have grown quite rapidly during the
past decade, although the pace of growth shows some evidence of abat-
ing. From 1976 to 1993, HMO enrollment grew more than 580% (from 6
million to more than 40.8 million); from July 1991 to July 1992, enroll-
ment rose 6.4%.124
If HMOs are successful in achieving cost reductions, their impact will
be felt market-wide. HMOs' lower costs will be reflected in lower premi-
ums, thus making HMOs attractive to consumers and businesses alike. If
the market for insurance is competitive, competing insurers (i.e., tradi-
tional fee-for-service) will be constrained somehow to replicate these sav-
ings in order to offer comparable premium reductions. Interesting
empirical questions, therefore, are: (1) whether HMOs have fulfilled their
promise of reduced resource use (for a given care level); and (2) if so,
whether their success has forced traditional insurers to modify their be-
havior. These issues have been addressed in a relatively large body of
research that has so far yielded evidence that HMO growth has: (1).re-
duced hospital admissions; (2) reduced resource use once the patient is
admitted to the hospital; (3) altered physician incentives and behavior;
and (4) not led to a significant reduction in quality of care. 1"
1. Evidence that HMOs Work.
An early study by Goldberg and Greenberg found that hospital utiliza-
tion among Blue Cross enrollees was lower in markets where HMO pene-
tration was high, suggesting that traditional insurers respond to the
competitive constraint imposed by HMO plans.126 Noether found that
HMO market share was positively related to hospital expenses, but that
many consumers. However, if consumers cannot evaluate the quality of care, the growth of
HMOs could be due to a lower than desired quality of care rather than to a better match to
consumer preferences.
124. Data from InterStudy, Aug. 1993.
125. These results seem to be more commonly found for staff or network model HMOs
compared to the more loosely affiliated IPA-type HMOs. In addition, none of the results
(except perhaps for the hospital admissions reduction) are confirmed beyond doubt. As
HMOs and other health care provision systems have evolved over time, the distinctions
between categories have blurred. Many health care systems have installed incentive sys-
tems that try to mimic those used by HMOs. For a description of these changes and a
review of some of HMO-related research, see Ellen M. Morrison & Harold S. Luft, Health
Maintenance Organization Environments in the 1980s and Beyond, 12 HEALTH CARE Fi-
NANCINo REV. 81 (1990).
126. Lawrence G. Goldberg & Warren Greenberg, The Competitive Response of Blue
Cross to the Health Maintenance Organization, 18 ECON. INOUIRY 55 (1980). This study
suffered from problems in determining the cause of the effect. The results were quite
sensitive to the inclusion or exclusion of certain Western region dummy variables.
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an increase in HMO market share resulted in reduced costs.1 27 She inter-
preted this as evidence that HMO entry is provoked by high hospital
costs that are eventually reduced as HMOs increase their share. 28
Johnson and Aquilina found that, in 1982, patients insured by Twin Cit-
ies-area HMOs experienced significantly shorter lengths-of-stay than did
patients insured by other payers.129 The authors concluded that this was
not due to self-selection (i.e., HMOs attracting relatively healthy enroll-
ees), but rather to the incentive effects of HMOs.130 Examining disaggre-
gated data for seven diagnosis-related groups (DRGs), the authors found
that when factors such as hospital bed size, patient age, sex, and illness
severity were held constant, members of HMOs and other prepaid groups
exhibited significantly lower average lengths-of-stay.'13  The authors did
not conclude, however, that HMO introduction and development lead to
community-wide reductions in utilization.
In a randomized experiment, Manning et al. also found that a Seattle
HMO reduced hospital admissions and expenditures relative to a control
127. NOETHER, supra note 95, at 72.
128. Noether also found that the hospital prices were higher in those areas with greater
HMO market penetration (possibly indicating that HMOs initially enter markets with high
prices). The change in HMO market share, however, is'negatively related to hospital
prices and costs, implying that as HMO growth occurs, hospital prices fall significantly. Id.
at 71-72, 84-85.
129. Allan N. Johnson & David Aquilina, The Impact of Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions and Competition on Hospitals in Minneapolis/St. Paul, 10 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.
659 (1986).
130. For a survey of the empirical evidence on the HMO self-selection issue, see Gail R.
Wilensky & Louis F. Rossiter, Patient Self-Selection in HMOs, 5 HEALTH AFFAIRS 66, 70
(1986) (summarizing 21 articles published between 1974 and 1986 and relating that ten
studies found that HMOs select low-risk patients, three found that HMOs select high-risk
subscribers, and eight reported no evidence of biased selection). See also Kathryn M.
Langwell & James P. Hadley, Evaluation of the Medicare Competition Demonstrations, 11
HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 65, 68 (1989) (finding more recently that enrollees in the
26 HMOs that participated in the Medicare Competition Demonstration 1984-1986 were
significantly healthier than average nonenrollees). For a general discussion of the theoreti-
cal issues involved, see John Newhouse, Is Competition the Answer?, 1 J. HEALTH ECON.
110 (1982); Joseph P. Newhouse, Cream-Skimming, Asymmetric Information, and a Com-
petitive Insurance Market, 3 J. HEALTH ECON. 97 (1984); Mark V. Pauly, Is Cream-Skim-
ming a Problem for the Competitive Medical Market?, 3 J. HEALTH ECON. 87 (1984);
Gregory C. Pope, Hospital Nonprice Competition and Medicare Reimbursement Policy, 8 J.
HEALTH ECON. 147 (1989).
131. Using a sophisticated econometric methodology to correct for self-selection biases,
Welch et al. came to a similar conclusion. W.P. Welch et al., Health Care Costs in Health
Maintenance Organizations: Correcting for Self-Selection, in ADVANCES IN HEALTH ECON.
& HEALTH SERVICES RES. 95 (1984). These results indicated that it is unlikely that un-
healthy persons have disproportionately selected traditional insurers.
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group. 132 As part of the RAND health insurance study, the authors ex-
amined relative health care use by three groups: (1) new randomly as-
signed HMO members; (2) previous members of the HMO; and (3) a
group of consumers who were covered by a free fee-for-service plan. The
comparisons indicated that the percentage of HMO members admitted to
the hospital one or more times was one-third less than that for the fee-
for-service group (7.1% versus 11.2%). In addition, expenditures per
person for HMO members was only 72% of that for persons under the
fee-for-service plan.133
In a related part of the RAND study,, Siu et al. found that the HMO
used in the RAND experiment did indeed differentially reduce "inappro-
priate" (or discretionary) surgery more .than it reduced all surgery. 3
Physicians reviewed 244 medical records and rated the appropriateness of
hospitalization and of the care provided by the hospital. The authors
found that the rate of discretionary surgery was lower for the HMO than
for the fee-for-service control group. The rates of nondiscretionary sur-
gery did not differ between the two groups. This relationship did not
appear to hold for medical admissions, however, where the HMO was
found to provide lower rates of hospitalization for both discretionary and
nondiscretionary medical admissions. The authors found no adverse con-
sequences flowing from the lower hospitalization rates.
Smaller-scale studies have also indicated that HMOs are likely to affect
physician and patient behavior. For example, Epstein et al. examined the
effects of HMOs on physicians' incentives to prescribe various ambula-
132. Manning et al., supra note 11.
133. Health outcomes for the three groups were generally similar and those who chose
the HMO plan voluntarily were as satisfied with their care as were those consumers using
the fee-for-service system. However, those new HMO members who were selected ran-
domly for the study were somewhat less satisfied with their care than were those consum-
ers in the fee-for-service system. For a crticism of the RAND study questioning the
generality of its results, see Harold S. Luft, HMOs and the Quality of Care, 25 INQUIRY
147, 148 (1988). See also Emmett B. Keeler & John E. Rolph, The Demand for Episodes of
Treatment in the Health Insurance Experiment, 7 J. HEALTH ECON. 337, 364-65 (1988) (em-
phasizing that the effects of cost sharing found in the RAND experiments came mainly
from reductions in the number of episodes of illness,.and not from a reduction in the cost
per episode); cf Allan N. Johnson et al., Differences in Inpatient Resource Use by Type of
Health Plan, 26 INQUIRY 388, 395 (1989) (finding that Minneapolis network HMOs did
appear to reduce in-hospital resource use relative to IPAs and fee-for-service provision;
thus HMO cost savings in Minneapolis, which features several competing HMOs, occurred
due to lower resource use after admission as well as to a lower initial number of
admissions).
134. Albert L. Siu et al., Use of the Hospital in a Randomized Trial of Prepaid Care, 259
JAMA 1343 (1988).
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tory tests for their patients.135 Using 1978-79 data on 354 Boston-area
patients with simple hypertension, the authors compared the rates at
which ten physicians in large fee-for-service groups and seventeen physi-
cians in two HMOs prescribed electrocardiograms (EKGs), chest films,
blood counts, and urinalyses. After correcting for patient age, sex, and
duration and severity of disease, and for physicians' experience, the au-
thors found that fee-for-service physicians requested 50% more EKGs
and 40% more chest X-rays than HMO-based physicians. 36 While the
results are based on a small sample, they tend to indicate that payment
methods may have a significant influence on the level of use of at least
some types of ambulatory testing.137 This further implies that prepaid
group incentive systems may substantially reduce the utilization of health
care resources.
McCusker et al. found that HMOs reduced hospitalization and costs.
They examined hospital costs for matched pairs of 100 terminally ill can-
cer patients in the Rochester, N.Y., area from 1976 to 1981.138 They
found that costs were 18% lower for those in the HMO sample. The
135. Arnold M. Epstein et al., The Use of Ambulatory Testing in Prepaid and Fee-For-
Service Group Practices. 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1089 (1986).
136. The statistical results were significant at the .006 and .11 levels, respectively, for
EKGs and chest X-rays. The results could not be explained by physician visit rates because
patients of fee-for-service physicians had significantly fewer visits than did HMO patients.
Id.
137. Iese results, showing that incentives matter, are consistent with findings by David
Hemenway et al., Physicians' Responses to Financial Incentives, 322 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1059 (1990) (comparing practice patterns for a small sample of physicians employed by a
chain of for-profit ambulatory care centers in Boston). In the Hemenway study, the physi-
cians switched from an hourly wage compensation plan to a plan in which bonuses were
paid based on the level of revenue brought into the firm. They found that physicians in-
creased testing per patient, total charges, and their incomes under the new plan. Id. Su-
perficially similar results were found in an examination of radiology. For a given set of
medical conditions, nonradiologist physicians who performed radiography themselves
tended to prescribe radiography procedures much more frequently than did nonradiologist
physicians who referred patients to independent radiology specialists for the same proce-
dures. Because one would expect physicians who make extensive, appropriate use of radi-
ology to have their own equipment on-site, this study may, not provide evidence of
innappropriate use, but rather evidence of variation in practice patterns across physicians.
Bruce J. Hillman et al., Frequency and Costs of Diagnostic Imaging in Office Practice - A
Comparison of Self-Referring and Radiologist-Referring Physicians, 323 NEW ENO. J. MED.
1604 (1990).
138. Jane McCusker et al., Do HMOs Reduce Hospitalization of Terminal Cancer Pa-
tients?, 25 INQuIRY 263 (1988). Beginning from 2,052 observed terminal cancer cases, 100
HMO patients were matched with 100 Blue Cross fee-for-service patients. The pairs were
matched according to the disease classification, age, months from diagnosis, and time pe-
riod. Id. at 264-65.
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results were not statistically significant when the matching methodology
was used, but they were significant when a covariance analysis was
applied.
139
Muldoon and Stoddart also provide evidence that HMOs hold the po-
tential for significant cost reductions, based largely on the experience of
an HMO in Sault Ste. Marie, Canada.' 4° They developed a simulation
model for Canada predicting the cost savings that would arise if the expe-
rience of that HMO was typical. They predicted that a switch to capita-
tion plans, such as HMOs, would result in cost reductions on the order of
ten percent in the most likely case. This result occurs mainly due to re-
ductions in hospital use, and not to consumer responsiveness to alterna-
tive health plan enrollment prices.' 4 '
HMO incentive mechanisms were also found to be of importance in
larger-scale reviews of HMO resource utilization. Hillman, Pauly, and
Kerstein used data from a 1987 survey of 337 HMOs to examine the rela-
tionship between several physician risk and reimbursement methods and
utilization.142 They regressed two measures of utilization (rate of hospi-
talization and rate of visits for outpatient services) on a set of explanatory
variables that included, among other things, a set of variables that de-
scribed the financial incentives facing physicians. They found that group
HMOs, for-profit HMOs, capitation schemes, and physician salary
schemes each resulted in lower hospitalization rates than did the use of
fee-for-service payment systems by the HMOs."4 3 Certain other financial
incentives also decreased the frequency of physician visits per enrollee,
but increases in the percentage of HMO patients in a physician's case
load was associated with a greater frequency of outpatient visits. The au-
thors suggested that the latter result may be attributable to physicians
substituting outpatient visits for higher cost referrals.' 4
139. Id. at 268-69.
140. Jacqueline M. Muldoon & Greg L. Stoddart, Publicly Financed Competition in
Health Care Delivery, 8 J. HEALTH ECON. 313 (1989).
141. Muldoon and Stoddart argue that the elasticity of plan enrollment with respect to
a change in plan price is a relatively small -0.25. Id. at 325.
142. Alan L. Hillman et al., How Do Financial Incentives Affect Physicians' Clinical
Decisions and the Financial Performance of Health Maintenance Organizations?, 321 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 86 (1989).
143. Id. at 89-91.
144. Id. at 90. Cf. Sally C. Stearns et al., Physician Responses to Fee-for-Service and
Capitation Payment, 29 INQUIRY 416 (1992). Stearns et al. examine the results of a natural
experiment in which an HMO covering a relatively young population of Wisconsin state
employees altered its payment structure to primary care physicians from a fee-for-service
structure to a capitation structure between 1983 and 1984. Specialist fees and hospital fees
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HMO effects were also examined in connection with the effort to con-
tain health care costs under the Medicare program. Langwell and Hadley
examined the effects of HMOs between 1984 and 1986 in the context of
the Medicare Competition Demonstration program.145 The authors used
HMO enrollee and nonenrollee surveys, comparative medical record ex-
aminations, and multivariate techniques to compare HMO-enrollee ver-
sus fee-for-service patient experience in overall satisfaction, quality of
care, access to and use of services, selection bias and, ultimately, effects
on Medicare costs.'46 The authors found that HMO quality was
equivalent to or better than fee-for-service quality, that hospital admis-
sions were lower by the second year (due, in part, to substitution to
skilled nursing facilities), that satisfaction was equivalent, but that HMOs
did not reduce total Medicare costs.' 47 Despite the other positive find-
ings, this final result occurred because HMOs drew a group of enrollees
that were healthy on average. 48 These persons would have imposed rela-
(which were paid based on fee schedules in both years) were reduced significantly in the
second year. In the new system, primary care physicians had first claim on any surplus at
the end of the year. The study follows the 2,000 persons who were enrolled in the plan in
both years to examine hospital and physician services utilization under the alternative re-
imbursement structures. The benefits offered to subscribers were nearly the same in the
two years except for out-of-plan reimbursement which was much more limited in the sec-
ond year. The authors report that following the change in payment structure, HMO hospi-
tal admissions fell by 16% (compared to a country-wide decline of 2.6%). Once in the
hospital, patients may have stayed slightly longer under the new plan and were charged
somewhat less in total for ancillary services, but the HMO's payment structure change did
not appear to alter significantly the in-hospital service patterns. The authors also found
that physician visits increased by 18% after the reimbursement change. The results imply
that this increase was due to increased referral to specialists rather than to increased pa-
tient-initiated visits to their primary care physician.
145. Langwell & Hadley, supra note 130.
146. Id. Langwell and Hadley gathered descriptive data on enrollees and their enroll-
ment choices, satisfaction, and access to care via surveys. The process of care was ex-
amined by comparing medical records for routine care for 1,600 fee-for-service and HMO
patients. A smaller number of comparative records (230-360 HMO and fee-for-service
patients) were also examined for more resource intensive illnesses, colorectal cancer and
congestive heart failure. Logit regression models were also applied to this data to examine
changes in health care status during enrollment. Multivariate models were also developed
to estimate the costs that HMO enrollees would have imposed on Medicare had they re-
mained in the fee-for-service system. Id
147. Id. at 78.
148. Id. See also Randall P. Ellis, Employee Choice of Health Insurance 1989, REV.
ECON. & STAT. 215 (finding extremely strong selection bias for one large financial firm that
offered various health plans with differing deductibles, copayments, and employee pre-
mium payment levels). As one might expect, employees quickly sort themselves into
groups of "sickies" and "healthies" as the healthies attempt to avoid subsidizing the sickies
and as sickies opt for plans that provide either more coverage or allow use of their favorite
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tively low costs on the health care system under either the HMO or fee-
for-service scheme. Medicare administrators apparently failed to fully in-
corporate this selection bias and paid the twenty-six HMOs 95% of the
area average per capita cost per enrollee. Since the HMO enrollees
tended to be much healthier than average, the system paid more to the
HMOs on a capitation basis than they would have paid to hospitals and
physicians on a fee-for-service basis. These results imply that HMOs may
have resulted in lower total real resource use, but that poor program ad-
ministration caused the gains to go to the HMOs rather than to the Medi-
care program.
149
Feldman et al. also found evidence that HMOs may reduce costs by
shopping for lower-priced hospital services.'50 The study examined 1986
data for six HMOs in four cities which used eighty-nine of the 322 hospi-
tals located in those cities. They found that staff-model HMOs tended to
concentrate patients at the lower-priced hospitals.15 1 The authors inter-
preted the regression results to imply that a hospital might lose 3% of its
medical-surgical admissions if it increased price by 1% to the HMO.
They found no such effect for the two independent practice association
(IPA) HMOs they examined. 52
Johnson et al. found evidence that network-type HMOs were able to
physicians. Ellis also found that the employees tended to be risk-lovers (i.e., undervalue
high dollar/low probability losses) in the range of $0 to $1,000).
149. Id. at 78. See also R. Brown & J. Hill, The Effects of Medicare Risk HMOs on
Medicare Costs and Service Utilization, MATHEMATICA POLICY RES., Jan. 19, 1993 (report-
ing similar findings from their review of 1990 data for 6,400 person samples of Medicare
HMO enrollees and nonenrollees). Brown and Hill found that the HMOs reduced the
amount of both hospital and physician care received by HMO enrollees compared to what
those persons would have received under Medicare fee-for-service provision (this reduc-
tion occurred due to reduced intensity of resource use for any given type of care). This
apparent enhanced efficiency did not, however, save Medicare money because the Medi-
care HMO reimbursement formula did not fully adjust for the better health, and lower
propensities to seek care of.the HMO enrollees compared to their fee-for-service counter-
parts. Id.
150. Roger Feldman et al., supra note 92. The authors estimated several regressions
examining (1) the probability that a particular HMO used a particular hospital for medical-
surgical patients, (2) a similar regression using a dummy variable for medical-surgical use,
and (3) a log-linear medical-surgical price equation. The model controlled for hospital
location, medical school or residency program, public versus private ownership, the
number of facilities at the hospital, occupancy rate, the hospital's market share of beds in
the HMO's region, an identifier for the staff-HMO or IPA-HMO, and average hospital
expense per admission. The authors used average price data and did not adjust for case-
mix differences. If HMOs shop for bargains on -individual medical-surgical procedures,
then there may be further price sensitivity that is masked by Feldman et al.'s approach. Id.
151. Id. at 221-22.
152. Id. at 221.
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reduce total resource use by reducing expenses once an admission had
occurred.' 5 3 The study examined the experience of several HMOs (and
twenty-nine hospitals) from the Twin Cities area during 1982 to 1984. Us-
ing fully billed charges as a proxy for resource use, Johnson et al. ex-
amined resource use for patients with any of five surgical and five
medical diagnoses.15 4 They found that, on average, fee-for-service health
plans (and IPA-type HMOs) had significantly longer lengths of stay and
higher total charges than did network HMOs. 55 The network HMO ef-
fects tended to be on the order of 5-10% reductions in cost or length of
stay, with the more consistent evidence appearing for the surgical
diagnoses.1
56
Robinson studied the effects of HMOs on the costs of 298 non-HMO,
nonpublic hospitals in California from 1983 to 1988.15' This was a period
after the state had removed its restrictions on selective contracting by
third-party payers. Holding constant several hospital characteristics,5 8
he found that cost per hospital admission grew at a 9% lower rate in
those markets where HMO penetration was high.' 59 The effects of
HMOs were greater in those markets where a large number of competing
hospitals existed."6 Robinson concluded that competition among HMOs
may have stopped nine percent of the 75% increase in cost per admission
153. Allan N. Johnson et al., supra note 133.
154. Id. at 390-92. The authors regressed three different dependent variables (length of
stay, total charges, ancillary charge ratio) on patient characteristics (age, sex, secondary
diagnoses, number of procedures), hospital characteristics (public teaching, bed size, occu-
pancy rate, location within city), health plan type, and season. Separate regressions were
run for each of the ten diagnosis codes. Id.
155. Id. at 395. In addition, the authors note that IPA-type HMOs in the Twin Cities
area tend to deal with all hospital providers and thus do not selectively contract with a
limited set of providers as do most network-type HMOs. The IPA-type HMOs may not,
therefore, provide sufficient incentives for participating hospital providers to economize on
the use of resources. Id. at 394.
156. Id.
157. James C. Robinson, supra note 25.
158. Id. at 2720. Robinson's regression model controlled for changes (from 1983 to
1988) in HMO market penetration, median family income, population density, physicians
per capita, hospital funding shares from Medicare and Medicaid, uninsured patient share,
the percentage change in average nonphysician salary, staffed beds, inpatient and outpa-
tient surgeries, outpatient visits, and six categories of inpatient days. Id.
159. Id. at 2721.
160. Robinson calculated the HMO market penetration using a method that defined a
market as the aggregate area from which a hospital drew any significant number of pa-
tients. He defined the number of competitors using a different method based on an area
with a radius of 24 kilometers from the hospital. The latter method resulted in the average
hospital having 24 competitors. Id.
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that occurred in California during this period.
161
The Florida Health Care Cost Containment Board also found that
HMOs and PPOs tended to be associated with lower hospital revenues
and costs on average.' 62 Using data for 209 Florida hospitals for 1990,
they found that the percentage of a hospital's patients that were insured
by a PPO or HMO was associated with lower average revenue or average
costs. 1 6 3 The coefficients appear to imply that a doubling of HMO/PPO
presence would be associated with a decrease of 2-4% in average reve-
nues or costs.
164
Bradbury et al. used 1988 to 1989 data on 9,000 patient admissions to
compare the length of stay experienced by those covered by IPA-type
HMOs and traditional insurance.' 65 They examined ten common diagno-
sis related groups at ten hospitals where patients were covered either by
an IPA or by traditional Blue Cross fee-for-service coverage. The authors
regressed length of stay on insurance type, a hospital indicator variable,
measures of hospital characteristics (teaching, occupancy and bed-size
groups), patient characteristics (age, sex), DRG category, an illness sever-
ity at admission index, and year. They found that for a given illness and
severity, the patients of the IPA-type HMO had shorter lengths of stay
once they were admitted to the hospital.166 The authors noted that this
finding is inconsistent with earlier literature which indicated (1) that
HMOs generally only reduced hospitalization rates, but not resource use
once admitted; or (2) that network HMOs might work but that IPA-type
HMOs did not. They attributed the differing results to improvements in
managed care and utilization review techniques during the 1980s. 167
As part of their Medical Outcomes Study,168 Greenfield et al. recently
confirmed the common conclusion that HMOs lead to reduced hospitali-
161. Id.
162. FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 93.
163. For a description of the model and econometric problems in this study, see discus-
sion supra part IV.C.
164. The study did not distinguish between HMO and PPO effects, so it is not possible
to determine whether the effect is due only to HMOs (as some other studies might sug-
gest), or whether the PPO effect also contributed to the reduction in average costs or
revenues. FLORIDA STUDY, supra note 93.
165. Robert C. Bradbury et al., Comparing Hospital Length of Stay in Independent
Practice Association HMOs and Traditional Insurance Programs, 28 INQUIRY 87 (1991).
166. Id. at 92-93.
167. Id.
168. Sheldon Greenfield et al., Variations in Resource Utilization Among Medical Spe-
cialties and Systems of Care: Results From the Medical Outcomes Study, 267 JAMA 1624
(1992).
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zation rates. Using a sample of 349 doctors covering 20,000 patients in
three cities in 1986, they examined several measures of resource use (hos-
pitalization, doctor visits, lab tests) and medical outcomes across various
provider groups (HMOs, fee-for-service solo practitioners, group practi-
tioners, etc.). The authors used various regression techniques to try to
control for factors that might account for any selection bias. They found
that HMOs had 41% fewer hospitalizations than did fee-for-service solo
practice physicians after adjusting for patient mix, disease severity, and
other demographic factors (five versus seven hospitalizations per 100
patients).'69
2. Evidence That HMOs Do Not Work
The evidence that HMOs have reduced the use of health care resources
is ambiguous. 7 ° For example, Frank and Welch criticized earlier work on
HMO effects for methodological shortcomings. 171 One of the key points
Frank and Welch raised is the possibility that the prior literature did not
adequately control for the simultaneity that exists between utilization and
HMO market shares. 72 That is, HMO market shares may be high in
markets where health care utilization is high precisely because those are
the areas where HMOs can initially lead to the greatest cost saving.
173
Frank and Welch concluded that it would be "premature" to accept find-
ings that HMO penetration and utilization are positively related.
74
169. Id. at 1628.
170. Some studies find both good and bad results depending on the particular HMOs
studied. For example, McCombs et al. examined two HMOs in the Medicare Demonstra-
tion Project and found that one group-model HMO appeared to lower monthly hospital
and physician charges by 38% while another IPA-type HMO was associated with 38%
higher charges. Jeffrey S. McCombs et al., Do HMOs Reduce Health Care Costs?: A Mul-
tivariate Analysis of Two Medicare HMO Demonstration Projects, 25 HEALTH SERVICES
REs. 593 (1990).
171. Richard G. Frank & W.P. Welch, The Competitive Effects of HMOs: A Review of
the Evidence, 22 INQuIRY 148 (1985) (criticizing Goldberg & Greenberg, supra note 126,
and Joel W. Hay & Michael J. Leahy, Competition Among Health Plans: Some Preliminary
Evidence, 50 S. ECON. J. 831 (1984)).
172. Id. at 151.
173. This suggests that HMO presence and market share is endogenous to the system,
and therefore that HMO presence/share should be jointly analyzed with the utilization
variables in a simultaneous equations econometric framework.
174. Frank & Welch, supra note 171, at 158. Roger Feldman et al., provide some evi-
dence that HMOs did not significantly affect hospitals' financial performance as one might
have expected if they had a market-wide impact. Roger Feldman et al., The Competitive
Impact of Health Maintenance Organizations on Hospital Finances: An Exploratory Study,
10 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 675 (1986). These authors applied regression analysis to
1979-81 data to examine the effect of HMOs on 32 Minneapolis/St. Paul area hospitals. See
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In an attempt to address the simultaneity problem identified by Frank
and Welch, McLaughlin estimated a two-equation simultaneous-equa-
tions model in which HMO market share and hospital utilization and
costs were endogenously determined."' The study employed pooled
cross-section time-series data for twenty-five SMSAs observed during the
1972-82 period. McLaughlin found that growth in HMO share induced
reductions in per-capita admissions and average length-of-stay, but also
induced higher average costs per admission and per patient day.'76 This
initially surprising result is quite reasonable when one realizes that it is
likely to be an artifact of the use of historical accounting data to measure
hospital costs.' 77 As the author notes, the hospital cost variables have a
fixed cost component and those costs may also be sunk (that is, they can-
not be recouped). 7 If HMOs reduce admissions by hospitalizing only
the more severely ill patients, the fixed (or sunk) costs of hospitals that
cannot be avoided in the short run will be amortized over a smaller
number of persons who require more resource-intensive care. Until these
assets are removed from the hospital's books, average hospital account-
ing costs will rise as the number of inpatients falls. This relationship,
however, provides a misleading picture' of the real resource costs of pro-
viding health care. The real resources used to provide care will be lower
and total health care costs will fall, since patients formerly treated in hos-
pitals will receive their care from lower cost sources (e.g., ambulatory
also Harold S. Luft et al., The Competitive Effects of Health Maintenance Organizations:
Another Look at the Evidence From Hawaii, Rochester, and Minneapolis/St. Paul, 10 J.
HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 625 (1986) (arguing that a hospital's financial performance in
the Twin Cities-measured in terms of cost, revenue and profit per admission-was unre-
lated to the share of admissions that the hospital received from group HMOs). Feldman et
al. venture no conclusions regarding the hypothesis that city-wide HMO activity affects
average hospital costs or prices, because they have data for only one city and thus have
only one relevant observation.
175. Catherine McLaughlin, HMO Growth and Hospital Expenses and Use: A Simulta-
neous-Equation Approach, 22 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 183 (1987).
176. Additional explanatory variables included a variety of SMSA-level demographic
variables (e.g., income, unemployment rate, age, education) as well as data on the number
of providers (e.g., physician/population ratios). Id.
177. This result is similar to that obtained by Jeffrey Merrill & Catherine McLaughlin,
Competition Versus Regulation: Some Empirical Evidence, 10 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L.
613 (1986), who used single-equation estimation techniques. The regression estimated in
both the 1986 and 1987 studies did not adjust for case-mix differences across the 25 SM-
SAs, nor were controls imposed for hospital ownership, concentration, or system affilia-
tion. SMSA dummy variables were included in both studies to account for such
specification errors. It is not clear whether the results would be invariant to these errors.
178. McLaughlin, supra note 175, at' 195. '
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care centers). Moreover, in the long run, average costs will fall as well.179
Thus, the evidence contained in McLaughlin is consistent with the effi-
ciency-enhancing aspects of HMOs."s
Although McLaughlin's critique of the HMO evidence falls short,
other critics of HMOs have also argued that the apparently salubrious
effects of HMOs may actually be due to other market factors. For exam-
ple, Luft et al. examined cases of HMO growth in Minneapolis, Hawaii,
and Rochester, and found that- while a significant reduction in hospital
use occurred in each case, it is not clear that HMOs were the principal
cause of the utilization reduction.18' They attributed the changes to data
errors, trends predating HMO growth, other policy changes, and other
forms of competition. The more recent data from California and the
Medicaid HMO experiment tend to weaken this critique, but assigning
causes to particular observed outcomes in these markets is difficult due to
the melange of regulation and competition existing in each market. 82
A key argument concerning the effects of HMOs is that the apparent
cost saving effects of HMOs might actually be due mainly to self-selection
as relatively healthier individuals choose the HMO option. Leibowitz et
al. examined the performance of an HMO serving a heavily Hispanic, Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)/Medicaid population. 83
179. McLaughlin did not control for factors (such as CON regulation, which often af-
fects bed reductions as well as increases) that would influence the rate of adjustment to the
new long-run equilibrium. Id.
180. This is not McLaughlin's interpretation. She concludes that HMOs are not effec-
tive instruments for reducing health care costs. Id. at 200. Other researchers have noted
that McLaughlin's empirical work suffers from a specification error that would virtually
ensure that no HMO effect could be found even if such an effect existed. See B. Bruce
Zellner & Barbara L. Wolfe, HMO Growth and Hospital Expenses: A Correction, 24
HEALTH SERViCES RES. 409, 412 (1989).
181. Luft et al., supra note 174.,
182. See Kathryn M. Langwell, Structure and Performance of Health Maintenance Orga-
nizations: A Review, 12 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 71 (1990); Luft, supra note 133.
Both articles provide critiques in a similar vein. They argue that the evidence that older,
well-established HMOs "worked" may be less convincing than it appears. Luft focuses
most particularly on HMO quality and argues that HMOs might reduce quality below that
associated with fully-insured fee-for-service care in the future, even if HMOs have not
done so previously. Luft, supra note 133, at 154-55. Langwell argues that we cannot read-
ily predict the future effects of HMOs on the health care system because (1) the evidence'
on the effects of incentives on physician and hospital behavior is still unclear, and (2) the
HMOs that have been the subject of previous research are sufficiently different from other
HMOs that they may not be representative of the average HMO. Langwell, supra, at 75,
78.
183. Arleen Leibowitz et al., A Randomized Trial to Evaluate the Effectiveness of a
Medicaid HMO, 11 J. HEALTH ECON. 235 (1992).
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Because the Medicaid recipients were randomly assigned to the HMO or
to an alternative fee-for-service (FFS) system, the authors were able to
compare the performance of the HMO to that of FFS while controlling
for much of the self-selection. Because all participants were Medicaid
eligible, they were covered for all expenses regardless of choice of plan.
The authors were not able to control for all self-selection, however, be-
cause the participants were free either to never enroll in the HMO after
assignment or to quit the HMO and enter the FFS system at any time
during the experiment. This meant that the cost associated with a panel
of randomly assigned individuals in each system cannot be observed. The
direction of bias from this effect is unclear. One might expect the sickest
individuals who have strong ties to particular doctors to opt for the FFS
system and thus never to enroll in the HMO, or to quit an HMO once
illness strikes. This would bias the results in favor of the HMO. On the
other hand, when one compares the FFS group with the HMO group one
must assign FFS care to the HMO assignees who chose not to participate
in the HMO. This gives the HMO no opportunity to reduce costs for
those individuals, because they never participated in the HMO program.
This would tend to bias the results against the HMO.
Leibowitz et al. found the now common result that the HMO-enrolled
population used less health care, but they attributed all of the reduction
to self-selection. 1" That is, while those persons who were assigned to the
HMO and actually enrolled in the plan used less care, this was due to the
relatively good health of the HMO enrollees. One interesting result was
that the HMO enrollees had lower utilization, but not lower average ex-
penses compared to FFS participants. Once the HMO enrollees were
hospitalized, their expenses were above those of FFS participants. The
study also found that the HMO did not save the state money, because
state administrators did not account for the good health of HMO partici-
pants when determining the reimbursement to be paid; thus, the state
overpaid the HMO on a per capita basis. This is similar to results re-
ported by Langwell and Hadley.
185
The authors conjecture that the HMO in this particular experiment
might not have had much ability to reduce costs due to the characteristics
184. The regression model used dummy variables to indicate the group to which the
individual was randomly assigned. The model further controlled for participant character-
istics such as age, sex, family size, and length of time in the HMO. The models examined
the probability of outpatient care or hospital care, and the average HMO or FFS care
recipients' expenses each month. Id. at 242-43, 246.
185. See Langwell & Hadley, supra note 130.
! ,
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of the population served. Most HMOs reduce expenses by reducing hos-
pitalization.' 86 This population was provided with hospitalization mainly
for pregnancy, and those hospitalizations are not avoidable by prevent-
ative care or enhanced patient screening. Another possibility is that the
Medicaid reimbursement for FFS is so low in any event that FFS practi-
tioners have no incentive to overprescribe in the first instance, so HMO
incentives could not matter much.
Feldman et al. also question the value of HMOs.'87 Their study ex-
amined the health care strategies of 922 Minnesota firms and concluded
that offering an HMO option increased health care premiums by $4 to
$25 per month. Using 1985 survey data from the firms, the authors esti-
mated equations explaining: (1) the probability that a firm offers an
HMO; (2) HMO enrollment share; (3) FFS premiums; and (4) HMO pre-
miums. Several characteristics of the firms are used to explain these fac-
tors. The explanatory variables relate to the firm's employee size and
location, the firm's unionization levels, the firm's predisposition to accede
to employee preferences, its priorities about the cost and hassle of offer-
ing multiple health plans, the coinsurance and deductible rates offered in
its HMO or FFS plans, and other characteristics of the firm or its em-
ployees. Although the regression models do not provide a good fit to the
data, the results indicate that HMO use is associated with higher health
care premiums.188
Some authors have also examined a narrower question about one pos-
sible effect of HMOs. Do HMOs contribute to lower administrative costs
for hospitals? Using Medicare accounting data for 6,400 hospitals, Wool-
handler et al. compared the average administrative costs of hospitals in
1990 in states with significant HMO penetration (20 or 25% of the popu-
lation enrolled) with those in states with less HMO penetration.' 89 They
found that hospitals in states with greater HMO penetration have slightly
higher average administrative costs (26% versus 25%).
186. Leibowitz et al., supra note 183, at 254.
187. Roger Feldman et al., The Effects of HMOs on Premiums in Employment-Based
Health Plans, 27 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 779 (1993).
188. An earlier paper by the same group of authors using the same data indicated that
premiums were lower when an HMO was offered. Gregory Gifford et al., A Simultaneous
Equations Model of Employer Strategies for Controlling Health Benefit Costs, 28 INQUIRY
56 (1991). The authors offered no explanation for the contradictory results. The 1991
paper used a different set of variables in the regression and a different (and likely inferior)
estimation technique. The differing results indicate the fragility of the findings.
189. Steffie Woolhandler et al., Administrative Costs in U.S. Hospitals, 329 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 400 (1993).
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3. Do HMOs Affect Other Insurers?
If HMOs were able to reduce utilization and costs, they presumably
would be driven by competitive forces to reduce premiums. Indeed,
there are a number of studies indicating that HMOs charge lower premi-
ums than conventional insurers, and that the rate of growth of HMO pre-
miums has been lower than that of their traditional counterparts. 19° If
program enrollment is responsive to premium differentials, rival insurers
will be compelled to achieve similar premium reductions, or else experi-
ence a decline in market share.' 91 It is therefore important to measure
the price elasticity of program enrollment.
Frank and Welch reported the results of two studies that found that
consumers are sensitive to the relative premiums charged in a market by
HMOs and other insurance providers."9 Piontkowski and Butler found
that over a ten-year period, Kaiser Health Plan enrollments in Northern
California were strongly and positively related to the ratio of the Blue
Cross premium to the Kaiser premium. In a later study of health plan
choice, McGuire found that the probability of HMO enrollment was posi-
tively associated with the Blue Cross premium.193 More recently, Feld-
man et al. examined the effects of out-of-pocket costs and plan
characteristics on the choice of health plans made by 3,000 employees of
seventeen Minneapolis firms. 94 One focus was to determine whether
substitution occurred between HMOs and health plans allowing more
physician choice (i.e., indemnity plans).195 Feldman et al. found that the
ability to choose physicians was a factor that significantly distinguished
one group of plans from another group. However, they also found some
significant substitution between HMOs and indemnity plans. The results
also indicated that employees were quite sensitive to the out-of-pocket
costs of the various plans. If. these results are generally true, then low
190. See Frank & Welch, supra note 171, at 149, 152.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. T. McGuire, Price and Membership in a Prepaid Group Practice, 19 MED. CARE
172 (1981).
194. Roger Feldman et al., The Demand for Employment-Based Health Insurance
Plans, 24 J. HUM. RESOURCES 115 (1989).
195. The nested logit model describes the probability that an employee picks a particu-
lar employee-based insurance plan as a function of (1) out-of-pocket costs, (2) plan charac-
teristics such as coverage of preventative care, deductibles, percent copayments, stop loss
levels, physician choice, and waiting times for services, and (3) enrollee characteristics such
as age, sex and chronic illnesses. The model was estimated separately for individuals and
family plan purchasers. Id. at 120-21.
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pricing by one plan should induce lower pricing by other plans offered in
the market. This effect, in turn, could cause a reduction in health care
costs. 1 96 The above-mentioned studies each indicate that health care in-
surance choices are influenced, at least to some degree, by financial
considerations.
While there is nearly a consensus that HMOs have led to reductions in
certain categories of resource use, HMOs do not necessarily improve the
allocation of resources.' 97 It is possible that the reduction in resource use
could result in a lower quality of care. 198 This is, of course, not a problem
196. See Alain C. Enthoven, Multiple Choice Health Insurance: The Lessons and Chal-
lenge to Employers, 27 INQUIRY 368 (1990) (arguing that true competition may require the
existence of multiple HMOs to ensure that solitary HMOs in a market do not retain all of
their "cost advantages" by pricing just barely below the rates charged by fee-for-service
plans). A recent employer survey implies, however, that HMOs cost about $3,000 per
enrollee in 1991, which is 15% less than the average for traditional fee-for-service plans.
Milt Freudenheim, Picking Winners Among HMOs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1992, at D6.
Thus, Enthoven's fear that HMOs will not pass on the savings to consumers may not be
materializing.
197. In a recent discussion of the evidence on managed care systems, Langwell notes
that while HMOs may reduce utilization, it is less obvious that they reduce system-wide
health care spending and that their effect may in any event be relatively small. See
KATHRYN M. LANGWELL, THE EFFECTS OF MANAGED CARE ON USE AND COST OF
HEALTH SERVICES, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (1992) (CBO Staff Memorandum).
While the evidence indicates that HMOs work in certain respects, it is probably true that
the literature will not support a confident prediction that continued growth of HMO- or
PPO-like institutions will have a large percentage effect on system-wide costs. Such an
effect could likely only be obtained by generalized demand reductions.
198. Studies of Medicare and Medicaid experience indicate that HMO-type capitation
payments or prospective reimbursement systems did not lead to reductions in most meas-
ures of the quality of care. See Deborah A. Freund et al., Evaluation of the Medicaid
Competition Demonstrations, 11 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV. 81 (1989); Langwell &
Hadley, supra note 130; William H. Rogers et al., Quality of Care Before and After Imple-
mentation of the DRG-Based Prospective Payment System: A Summary of Effects, 264
JAMA 1989 (1990); L.F. Rossiter et al., Patient Satisfaction Among Elderly Enrollees and
Disenrollees in Medicare Health Maintenance Organizations, 262 JAMA 57 (1989). Some
researchers have found that HMO care is as good or better than that provided to compara-
ble patients in a fee-for-service setting. See David M. Carlisle et al., HMO vs. Fee-for-
Service Care of Older Persons with Acute Myocardial Infarction, 82 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1626 (1992); Howard P. Greenwald & Curtis J. Henke, HMO Membership, Treatment, and
Mortality Risk among Prostatic Cancer Patients, 82 AM. J. Pun. HEALTH 1099 (1992); I.
Steven Udvarhelyi et al., Comparison of the Quality of Ambulatory Care for Fee-for-Ser-
vice and Prepaid Patients, 115 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 394 (1991); Kenneth B. Wells et al.,
The Effects of Prepaid Group Practice on Mental Health Outcomes, 25 HEALTH SERVS.
RES. 615 (1990). These authors used individual patient records to compare care provision
in different disease categories (e.g., hypertension, female preventive care, acute myocardial
infarction, prostatic cancer, and mental health) and used both outcome measures (mortal-
ity) as well as process of care measures of quality. In some cases, especially for preventive
care, these authors found that the HMO patients received more care, which may be incon-
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if consumers knowingly choose a lower cost/lower quality form of health
care provision.199 However, if consumers are unable to evaluate the
quality of care they receive, then HMOs could grow for reasons that have
more to do with consumer errors than with consumer benefits. Nonethe-
less, consumers have been choosing HMO provisions with increasing fre-
quency in the past decade. Unless consumers are consistently making
errors, this form of health care provision is likely to be welfare-
improving.
C. Preferred Provider Organizations (PPOs)
The willingness of hospitals to compete on price may be accelerated by
the development and growth of PPOs. The formation of PPOs represents
an explicit attempt by providers to attract additional business through
overt price competition. PPOs are formed when some entity, acting as an
agent for a group of patients (e.g., an employer, insurer, or an HMO),
negotiates a fee and service package with some collection of providers
(e.g., a set of hospitals or doctors). In exchange for a set of discounted
fees, the providers are offered the prospect of an increased patient flow.
The patients are usually free to patronize other providers, but are given
incentives, such as fee discounts or lower copayment provisions, to use
the contract providers.2'
sistent with the HMOs saving real resources. This result may have occurred because the
HMO patients tend to be fully insured for almost all care, leading HMO patients to prod
physicains for care more often than would patients covered by a fee-for-service system with
larger copayments and deductibles. Opposing evidence also exists. For example, there is
some evidence that HMO incentive structures may have increased the probability that a
hospital patient would be discharged in a more unstable condition. See William H. Rogers
et al., supra. In addition, Lindberg et al. examined data from 1977 to 1986 and found that
age-adjusted death rates rose above projections and hospital admissions and lengths of stay
fell for the elderly in Hennepin County, Minnesota after Medicare introduced HMOs and
the prospective payment mechanism for hospitals in 1984. See Gregory L. Lindberg et al.,
Health Care Cost Containment Measures and Mortality in Hennepin County's Medicaid
Elderly and All Elderly, 79 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1481 (1989). Another study found that
Medicare inpatient mortality for 16 common surgical or medical conditions was greater for
hospitals located in states with higher percentages of HMO enrollment. Stephen M.
Shortell & Edward F. X. Hughes, The Effects of Regulation, Competition, and Ownership
on Mortality Rates Among Hospital Inpatients, 318 NEw ENO. J. MED. 1100 (1988).
Greater competition (the existence of two or more close rivals as perceived by hospital
CEOs) did not affect mortality rates, however. Id.
199. See Harold S. Luft et al., Does Quality Influence Choice of Hospital?, 263 JAMA
2899 (1990) (arguing that quality is a significant determinant of hospital choice, though not
as important as distance in price). The authors conjecture that such sensitivity may occur
more due to physician preferences than to informed consumer choice. Id.
200. For a description of the various forms of PPOs, see Thomas L. Greaney & Jody L.
Hospital Market Structure
PPO growth has been quite rapid in the mid-1980s. Gabel et al. report
that the number of persons eligible (i.e., enrolled in a plan with a PPO
option) for a PPO increased from 1.3 million in December 1984 to 6.2
million in February 1986.201 As of February 1988, 45 to 50 million Ameri-
cans had the option of using a preferred provider.2 2 More recent esti-
mates indicate that in 1992, 58 million employees and 133.4 million
enrollees were covered by plans including a PPO option.20 3 The growth
in both PPOs and HMOs occurred as traditional insurers expanded their
offerings and as nontraditional insurance providers, such as hospital
chains and others, entered the field.2" While many of these plans went
through significant growing pains,201 PPO and HMO growth continued
throughout the decade.
PPOs possess attributes that, in principle, make them promising instru-
ments for stimulating price competition among hospitals.2°  We argued
earlier that it is costly for consumers to search for information about hos-
pital prices. There are many services involved, and most consumers par-
ticipate in the market only rarely. The PPO, as Dranove et al. point out,
transfers the function of selecting an efficient provider from the con-
sumer to someone with greater expertise (e.g., an insurer or employer).
20 7
The search costs, which are in large part fixed, are spread over a much
Sindelar, Physician-Sponsored Joint Ventures: An Antitrust Analysis of Preferred Provider
Organizations, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 513, 515-22 (1987) (focusing on the potential anticompeti-
tive effects of physician-sponsored PPOs).
201. Jon Gabel et al., The Emergence and Future of PPOs, 11 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y &
L. 305 (1986).
202. There were about 640 PPOs operating in the U.S. in 1988. Interview with Ed Pick-
ens, American Medical Care Review (Feb. 1989).
203. Data from InterStudy, supra note 124.
204. For discussions of the entry of hospitals into the insurance market, see Hospital
Chain Starts HMO, AM. MED. NEWS, Apr. 27, 1984, at 3; Ter Shahoda, Major Multis Un-
veil Insurance Plans, HosPrrALs, June 16, 1985, at 21; Martin Tolchin, Nonprofit Hospitals
Join to Offer Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1985, at A12.
205. See Constance Mitchell, Humana to Post Charge and Loss for 4th Quarter, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 3, 1986, at 7; Ter Shahoda, Multi's Retrench, Reshape Strategies in 1986, Hospi-
TALs, Dec. 20, 1986, at 36. Many HMOs that are not explicitly associated with hospital
chains have reported poor financial results in recent years. See Malcolm Gladwell, Grow-
ing Pains Plague Nation's HMOs, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 1988, at HI; Stephen K. Cooper,
Red Ink Afflicting Regional HMOs, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 6, 1988, at C1.
206. PPOs, however, do not usually possess all of the competition-enhancing features of
HMOs. Most importantly, physicians associated with PPOs do not normally bear the risk
associated with overutilization of resources and cost overruns. In addition, the PPO spon-
sor may not bear any of the insurance risk. As a result, PPOs may have less incentive than
HMOs to monitor utilization by member physicians.
207. David Dranove et al., The Effect of Injecting Price Competition into the Hospital
Market: The Case of Preferred Provider Organizations, 23 INQUIRY 418, 420 (1986).
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greater number of potential patients when the costs are incurred by a
PPO. Providers may find it attractive to make price cuts to PPOs, not
only because of the direct increase in output that will ensue, but also be-
cause it may be an efficient way to inform non-PPO members about their
low prices. 20 8 The small amount of existing empirical evidence is consis-
tent with the proposition that PPOs induce greater price competition
among hospitals. For example, Zwanziger and Melnick found evidence
that selective contracting has brought about a greater degree of price
competition in California since 1983.209 When PPOs contract with all
area physicians and hospitals, however, they may provide little incentive
for the providers to reduce resource use.2 10 This conclusion seems consis-
tent with work by Enthoven, Dranove et al., Johnson et al., and Melnick et
al., all of whom emphasize that selective contracting is a key to making
competition work.2 l ' Selective contracting gives PPOs and HMOs the
ability to contract with a limited set of health care providers in each com-
munity. This gives providers or provider groups an incentive to compete
on price dimensions, allowing health care insurance plans to develop in a
way that promotes price competition among rival plans and providers. If
state or Federal laws require that any and all health care providers be
allowed to provide care under a PPO or HMO contract, the incentives for
continued cost-consciousness may be abated.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although empirical studies of hospital behavior are plentiful, there is
relatively little reliable evidence about the effect of hospital market struc-
ture on competition and consumer welfare. In our opinion, this lack of
persuasive evidence stems from the fact that many of the studies failed to
address the questions most relevant to this issue. It is also partly attribu-
table to the research design most often adopted in studies of hospital
competition. Most of these studies have examined relationships between
market structure and accounting costs. Typically, these studies have
found that low concentration leads to higher average expenses. To some
economists, this conclusion suggests merely that welfare-enhancing, non-
price competition increases as concentration falls. More frequently, how-
208. Frech & Woolley, supra note 66.
209. Jack Zwanziger & Glenn A. Meinick, HMO Growth and Hospital Expenses: A
Correction, 24 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 409 (1989).
210. See Enthoven, supra note 196, at 372; Greaney & Sindelar, supra note 200.
211. See Dranove et al., supra note 56; Enthoven, supra note 197; Johnson et al., supra
note 133, at 397; Melnick et al., supra note 71.
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ever, this finding is often construed as evidence of "wasteful" nonprice
competition. Consequently, it is sometimes asserted that competition is
unworkable in hospital markets.
At least two objections can be raised to this "wasteful competition"
interpretation. First, the studies that examined the behavior of both
prices and expenses found that quality-adjusted prices fell as concentra-
tion declined, a relationship similar to that observed in many other indus-
tries. Second, and more fundamentally, there exists no theoretical
presumption that these higher quality levels are socially harmful; in fact,
the opposite presumption exists, provided that producers and consumers
face appropriate incentives.
Thus, the important policy question is whether or not participants in
health care markets confront appropriate incentives. There is evidence
suggesting that institutions that elicit greater cost sensitivity from patients
and their physician agents (e.g., HMOs, PPOs) are becoming more popu-
lar; for example, a growing empirical literature indicates that the pres-
ence of an HMO in an area leads to reduced rates of hospital utilization
in comparison to markets where hospitalization expenses are covered by
traditional indemnity insurers. Provided that legal impediments to the
creation of such innovative market institutions do not exist, one could
reasonably infer that these institutions offer hope for attenuating the
"market failures" that have arguably plagued the health care field.
That hospital markets differ from other markets does not imply that
competition cannot effectively allocate resources in those markets. It is
undeniable that participants in hospital markets' respond to financial in-
centives. The challenge facing both private and public decisionmakers is
to harness those incentives in order to improve market performanqe. Un-
til a few years ago, however, the scholarly literature on competition in
health care markets seemed incapable of providing guidance to these
decisionmakers. Researchers now appear to be posing some of the right
questions. In time, we may develop a better sense of the effects of com-
petition on hospital performance.
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